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This thesis traces the development of the compensation program for the All- 
Volunteer Force, 1973-1993, through a "lessons learned" approach. Eighteen 
lessons are highlighted in the study. The thesis describes the concepts behind the 
All-Volunteer Force and the philosophic rationale for the development of the 
compensation program. It analyzes, compares, and contrasts two major 
compensation approaches, called market and institutional. Consideration is also 
given to compensation standardization techniques of pay comparability and pay 
competitiveness. The thesis concludes with a discussion of issues pertinent to 
future compensation studies. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY 
General research methodology required extensive 
background research on the concept of the All-Volunteer 
Force (AVF).  Specific research was conducted on the 
development and progression of the compensation program from 
the time of the Gates Commission (The President's Commission 
on an All-Volunteer Armed Force) through the present. 
Analysis of identified major program changes was 
accomplished with the aid of studies by established research 
centers such as the RAND Corporation, Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO), General Accounting Office (GAO), and others. 
Their studies were used to support formulation of "lessons 
learned," which are the basis of this study. 
Research centered on three major areas:  market or 
institutional bases for compensation, standardizing 
approaches to military compensation, and potential problems. 
Each topic is handled as a separate chapter within this 
study. 
B. OVERVIEW OF ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 
The concepts of forced military obligations and 
voluntary service for the male population of the United 
States has been openly debated since the American 
Revolution.  George Washington established the foundation 
for forced military obligations when he stated 
It must be laid down as a primary position, and 
the basis of our system, that every citizen who 
enjoys the protection of a free Government, owes 
not only a proportion of his property, but even of 
his personal services to the defence of it.... 
(O'Sullivan and Meckler, 1974, p. xv) . 
The second amendment of the American Constitution, 
guarantying the right to bear arms, was based on the belief 
that every individual bore the responsibility for defense 
through the established militia system--not only for defense 
against outside foes, but potential internal tyrants or 
despots as well.  The concept of a standing army at the 
federal level often came in direct conflict with emerging 
states rights advocates.  The political, social, and 
economic development of the country was hotly debated by 
early politicians.  The country's direction was uncertain, 
but all citizens bore the responsibility for the defense of 
its hard-earned freedom.  The basic question was: "How 
should it be defended?"  Although some early leaders such as 
Washington proposed universal military service, the idea was 
never fully accepted and volunteerism became the underlying 
principle for military obligation in America. 
Throughout the next two-hundred years the United States 
witnessed the on-again, off-again use of a draft to meet 
military requirements.  The ideas of standing armies and 
universal military service were continually debated as the 
nation struggled to define itself.  However, a common 
philosophy opposed to conscription seemed to gain acceptance 
throughout the United States.  Popular actions supporting 
voluntary militia service and individual liberties after the 
American Revolution and the exemptions, commutations, and 
substitutions allowed during the Union and Confederate 
drafts of the Civil War all served to heighten acceptance of 
voluntary military service.  Through the Second World War, 
the use of conscripts was generally restricted to wartime. 
Mass peacetime conscription was not employed until after 
World War II when the United States determined that it 
needed a larger standing army than it could afford.  The 
need for such a large, standing army was created by the 
occupations of Germany and Japan and as a counter-power to 
the emergent Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
However, the perceived inequalities with the post-1940s 
draft supported Senator Robert A. Taft's position when "he 
spoke of recruiting 'by voluntary means' as 'in the American 
tradition'." (O'Sullivan and Meckler, 1974, p. xviii) 
The debate over voluntary military service or 
conscription intensified when President Johnson's National 
Advisory Committee on Selective Service reported its 
findings in 1967.  Commonly referred to as the Marshall 
Commission Report, it recommended some changes to the 
selective service system, but did, in fact, retain 
conscription as the basis for military service.  However, 
with the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, major changes to 
the system were considered.  President Nixon appointed a 
commission to study the concept of an AVF.  The President's 
Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, or Gates Commission, 
recommended removing reliance on the selective service 
system and implementing an AVF.  Specifically, the 
Commission stated, "We unanimously believe the nation's 
interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, 
supported by an effective stand-by draft...." (Gates 
Commission, 1970, p. iii)  President Nixon subsequently 
adopted the recommendations of the Gates Commission. 
Recognizing that the role of a standing military 
continued to be a polarizing issue, the commission stated in 
its 1970 report that a 
fundamental consideration that has guided this 
commission is the need to maintain and improve the 
effectiveness, dignity, and status of the armed 
forces so they may continue to play the proper 
role (Gates Commission, 1970, p. 5). 
The shift to an AVF was expected to ensure the proper role 
of the military by strengthening freedoms; allowing 
expressions of patriotism; promoting efficiency in the armed 
forces; and enhancing dignity in the armed forces. (Gates 
Commission, 1970, p. 6) 
Individualism and free choice are two concepts 
associated with the United States.  Since the nation's 
initial founding and subsequent expansion westward, 
Americans have placed high value on the capabilities of 
individual citizens to not only survive, but excel, on their 
own merits.  The ability to make individual decisions and 
live with the consequences is deeply rooted in American 
cultural heritage.  Adopting a voluntary military force 
enhanced this freedom.  It allowed individuals to choose for 
themselves the road in life they wanted to follow. 
The shift to an AVF matched the strengthening of 
freedoms with expressions of patriotism.  Every major 
conflict the United States has engaged in since the American 
Revolution has generally borne out the belief that most 
Americans are patriotic and support the objectives of its 
government.  However, in the late 1960s the unpopularity of 
the Vietnam War served as a catalyst to provoke a backlash 
against the selective service system.  Observers began to 
question the patriotism of American youth.  The Gates 
Commission felt an AVF would allow the "expression of the 
patriotism that has never been lacking among our youth." 
(Gates Commission, 1970, p. 6) 
Other arguments against the draft were purely economic 
in nature.  Major economic arguments against the draft 
centered on the ineffectiveness of the "tax-in-kind," wages 
paid to conscripts, and lost opportunity for individuals who 
had better alternatives than conscripted service.  Suffice 
it to say, theoretically, an AVF would counteract these 
draft disadvantages and promote efficiency within the armed 
forces.  Cooper and Rostker stated that "one of the major 
effects of the draft was to remove the military from the 
focus of the market place." (Cooper and Rostker, 1974, p. 2) 
The AVF would place the military into direct competition 
with other employers and educational institutions for 
limited quantities of eligible men.  By doing so, the armed 
forces had to become more efficient in their wages, work 
requirements, and conditions of employment to successfully 
attract required personnel. 
A major objective of the AVF was to instill a sense of 
dignity in the military services.  To achieve enhanced 
dignity in the Armed Forces, the Gates Commission was 
relying on the presence of all "true" volunteers and 
increased pay and benefits to positively affect the morale 
and dignity of the military.  Because of the threat of 
conscription, no precise numbers exist to identify exactly 
how many first-termers were "true" volunteers or 
"volunteers" only to avoid conscription.  The latter group, 
coupled with the conscripts, were occasional sources of 
malcontent within the armed forces.  The intent was to fill 
the ranks with individuals who desired to serve and pay an 
adequate wage to attract and retain them.  Table 1-1 
illustrates the estimated percentage of "true" volunteers in 
the armed forces prior to the AVF. 
Table 1-1 demonstrates how small the actual proportion 
of volunteers was for the armed forces. The majority of new 
accessions were either draftees or draft-motivated enlistees 
who joined to avoid the stigma of being drafted.  This large 
percentage has often been cited as part of the disciplinary- 
problems and costs of the draft era.  The intent of the 
commission was to employ only individuals who wanted to 
serve in the armed forces and thereby remove some of the 
problems that seemed to accompany the draft. 
Table 1-1 
Enlisted Military Manpower Procurement (thousands) 
Fiscal  Year 
Source of 
Procurement    i960     1964     1968     1970     1972     1974 
Total
 414 496 853 631 424 391 
Inductions 90 151 340 207 27 0 
Enlistments 324 345 513 424 397 391 
True 
Volunteer 158 183 223 210 330 391 
Draft- 
Motivated 166 162 290 214 67 0 
% True 
Volunteer 38 37 26 33 78 100 
Source:  Adapted from Richard. V. L. Cooper, Military 
Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force. 1977, p. 20. 
C.  OVERVIEW OF MILITARY COMPENSATION CONCEPTS FOR THE 
ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
The military pay system is generally comprised of basic 
pay, basic allowance for quarters (BAQ), and basic allowance 
for subsistence (BAS).  Basic pay is a function of the 
individual's grade and time-in-service.  It is heavily 
weighted towards seniority based upon the individual's 
time-in-service.  This is codified through a closed manpower 
system and internal labor market that, with few exceptions, 
obtains its leaders entirely from within.  The quarters and 
subsistence allowances are provided in lieu of free 
government housing or meals.  An individual may obtain 
either free government housing or a quarters allowance.  In 
some circumstances, both may be granted with special 
authorization.  These allowances are not taxable and led to 
the use of the "tax advantage" calculations as part of 
compensation considerations.  Tax advantage is basically the 
difference between the amount of money received by service 
members as non-taxable and the amount that they would have 
to pay in taxes if the money were taxable.  The tax 
advantage computations have had a significant impact on the 
compensation received by service members over the years. 
Finally, although not a regular part of military 
compensation, the Services employ incentive systems to 
attract and retain individuals in hard-to-fill fields or 
during times of poor retention.  Appendix A contains a list 
of all pay and allowances to illustrate the complexity of 
the compensation system. 
The military draft further complicated the compensation 
system by imposing a "tax" on draftees.  The Gates 
Commission intended to capture the tax-in-kind paid by 
draftees and spread the cost of the military to all 
taxpayers. (Gates Commission, 1970, p. 25)  The logic is 
that individuals would volunteer for the armed forces at the 
offered pay rates if the rates were attractive or benefited 
them.  Since eligible personnel did not volunteer in 
adequate numbers for the offered pay, then it was not 
attractive or beneficial to the draftees.  Potential 
recruits had better options for employment or use of their 
time.  Therefore, draftees paid a penalty or "tax" by being 
drafted.  This tax is said to consist of the difference 
between the provided pay and their perceived or actual 
benefit received from some other activity or employment. 
The government actually saves money for all other taxpayers 
by keeping wages low and drafting individuals to fill 
inadequately compensated positions.  Draftees pay the 
societal tax with their labor. (Amacher et al., 1973)  The 
Gates Commission noted the inequity of this system and 
concluded that the cost of the military should be borne by 
all taxpayers, not just a select few who were unable to 
avoid the draft. 
The draft had enabled Congress to keep draftee wages 
considerably lower than those paid competitively in the 
market place.  Congress had legislative authority to fill 
manpower needs and did not worry about competitive wage 
problems.  As discussed above, these low wages resulted in 
the tax-in-kind and "true" volunteer rates of around 35 
percent.  While it is recognized that individuals do not 
volunteer solely for monetary incentives, paying fairly 
competitive rates has assisted the armed forces in their 
recruiting efforts.  Table 1-2 compares total military 
compensation (basic pay, BAQ, BAS, incentives, bonuses, and 
estimated fringe benefits) with comparable civilian 
compensation. 
Table 1-2 vividly demonstrates how grossly underpaid 
conscripts were in 1970.  The Gates Commission proposed pay 
increases for these junior service members to bring their 
compensation levels in line with that of their civilian 
counterparts as well as other service members.  The 
commission recommended a pay raise of almost 50 percent for 
enlisted members in the first two years of service.  The 
Gates Commission felt these raises should be made on the 
basis of equity alone, regardless of the decision on the 
transition to an AVF.  Clearly, the nation was taking 
financial advantage of its military draftees.  Melvin Laird, 
Secretary of Defense in 1970, argued that there was a direct 
correlation between the compensation provided to the service 
members and their retention rates.  He felt that less 
competitive rates led to decreased retention which, in turn, 
adversely affected national security, the quality of life 
for service members, and the dignity of the armed forces. 
(Laird, 1980, pp. 13-15)  Similarly, the Gates Commission 
Table 1-2 
Comparison of Compensation Profiles for Enlisted Men and a 
Comparable Population of Civilians, by Length of Service 
(197 0 Pay Rates) 
Total Total Mil Comp 
Years of Military Civilian divided by 
Service Compensation Compensation Civ Comp (%) 
1 $3,251 $5,202 62.5 
2 3,935 5,803 67.8 
3 5,275 6,370 82.8 
4 6,249 6,908 90.5 
5 8,516 7,409 114.9 
6 8,151 7,876 103.5 
7 8,741 8,306 105.2 
8 9,125 8,691 105.0 
9-1C ) 9,505 9,065 104.9 
Source: Adapted 
Armed 
from The Presd .dent's Commission on an All- 
Volunteer Force, 1970, p. 53. 
argued that competitive rates lead to increased retention 
and attractiveness of military service.  The identification 
of specific raises to be recommended were dependent upon the 
following: the number of accessions needed each year; the 
number of true volunteers attracted at current levels of 
pay; and the extent to which raises in compensation 
increased the flow of volunteers. 
While the impact of compensation increases were not 
known at the time, the feelings are obvious.  To attract and 
retain enough volunteers to staff an AVF, compensation 
packages had to be competitive with those available in the 
civilian sector.  The program had to be beneficial and 
attractive to eligible personnel.  The compensation paid to 
service members had to change in order to equitably 
distribute the cost of our national defense. 
D.  UNIQUENESS OF MILITARY SERVICE 
...the major difference is that members of the 
armed forces are legally liable to armed combat. 
This is their distinguishing characteristic, and 
whatever specialization for specific duties a 
member of an armed force may have is secondary to 
the primary function of armed combat (Military 
Compensation Background Papers (MCBP), 1987, p. 
7) . 
The primary difference between military service and 
civilian employment involves a degree of control and impact 
of actions.  Military service requires unique one-way 
control and obedience to orders.  Once orders are given, 
there is little, if any, opportunity for internal debate. 
To accomplish national goals, our nation's leaders must be 
able to: legally require the force to fight, and be able to 
punish those who disobey; use the force when needed for as 
long as required without regard to individual preference; 
"fire" performers who may desire to stay and retain those 
who may want to leave, all for the government's convenience; 
force retirement for individual members and recall them to 
active duty as required; and hold members in an idle status 
for indefinite periods and then put them wherever they are 
needed. (5th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 
(QRMC), 1984, p. 1-4) 
Such limitations require total dedication on the part 
of the individuals who serve in the armed forces.  They must 
relinquish personal control to the government over the 
following: exposure to the risks of combat; relocation of 
themselves and/or their families; work requirements on 
10 
holidays, weekends, and overtime; family separations; and 
exposure to conditions and hazards of field duty. (5th QRMC, 
1984, p. 1-5) 
Forfeiture of these individual rights to the military 
institution drives many normal, patriotic Americans away 
from military service.  These are not the only rights or 
elements of personal control that service members have to 
relinquish.  For example, military personnel cannot "quit" 
when they desire, since most serve under fixed contracts or 
obligations.  If the member does not fall victim to a forced 
retirement or separation, he or she still must continue to 
progress up a pyramidal promotion structure.  There is no 
provision to allow career service members to stay in a job, 
at a given rank, for extended portions of their career.  If 
not selected to progress, separation or retirement is 
mandatory.  Even if selected to progress, careers in the 
military are short-lived, as retirement is mandatory between 
twenty and thirty years of service.  Because of these 
conditions, "military leaders have gone to great lengths to 
create a professional identity—literally a different way of 
life in which cohesion, unity of purpose, and reciprocal 
loyalty are emphasized." (Binkin and Kyriakopoulos, 1981, 
pp. 21-22) 
These job-related factors comprise the negative side of 
the so-called "X-factor."  The X-factor is the 
nonquantifiable part of military life that makes it unique 
when compared with civilian life.  How to compensate 
individuals for the hardships imposed is a recurring debate 
in military compensation battles. (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, 
pp. 53-56)  Military life requires a special blend of 
commitment, obedience, and sacrifice to succeed.  Millions 
of Americans over the years have accepted these 
requirements; some willingly, others unwillingly.  The 
pressures and hazards of this "way of life" make it unique 
11 
among professions in the world. Despite difficulty in 
quantification, the X-factor is an integral element in 
determining military compensation. 
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II.  DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY COMPENSATION, 
1973-1993 
The 7th QRMC states that "the purpose of the military 
compensation system, like any compensation system, is to 
attract, retain, and motivate people." (7th QRMC, 1992, 
p. 16)  As this quote indicates, all compensation systems 
have the same basic goals and functions.  As Richard 
Henderson observes in his book, Compensation Management, 
"the compensation system results from the allocation, 
conversion, and transfer of the income of an organization to 
its employees for their monetary and in-kind claims on goods 
and services." (Henderson, 1989, p. 2)  This definition 
applies equally to military or civilian compensation 
programs.  For the U.S. military,, the "income of an 
organization" is the income generated by the government 
through taxes or other revenue mechanisms.  "Monetary" 
claims refer to regular pay entitlement and "in-kind claims" 
to housing, messing, and other similar entitlements provided 
for the military.  Compensation deficiencies are continually 
addressed and modified as the system continues to evolve. 
The current system developed through almost annual 
modifications to original programs or implementation of new 
ones.  The development of the military compensation package 
was perhaps best described by Cooper in Military Manpower 
and the All-Volunteer Force; 
Today's compensation system is not...the result of 
a well structured approach designed to provide an 
equitable, but cost-effective compensation 
package.  Instead it is the result of a piecemeal 
approach whereby the addition and deletion of 
specific compensation elements have generally been 
argued more in terms of maintaining military 
benefits or implementing minor cost savings 
(Cooper, 1977, pp. 361-363). 
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This chapter concentrates on where the AVF compensation 
system started and changes that brought us to our present 
situation. 
A.  CHANGES IN REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION 
The largest component of military compensation is basic 
pay.  Basic pay is the primary method by which military 
members are compensated for their service.  However, basic 
pay is not the only pay or allowance used to determine 
appropriate pay increases.  The main tool of compensation 
comparison is regular military compensation or RMC.  Regular 
military compensation comprises basic pay, basic allowance 
for quarters or BAQ, basic allowance for subsistence or BAS, 
and the tax advantage of the nontaxable allowances. (Cooper, 
1977, p. 361)  The term, RMC, was first introduced in the 
Military Pay Act of 1965, and has evolved into a 
comprehensible measure that serves as the basis of 
comparison between military and civilian pay. (Binkin and 
Kyriakopoulos, 1981, pp. 15-17)  Regular military 
compensation was expanded in 1980, by Public Law 96-579, to 
include variable housing allowance (VHA) and overseas 
housing allowance (OHA). (GAO/NSIAD-84-41, 1984, p. 6)  The 
list of pays and allowances in Appendix A highlights the 
complexity of the compensation system.  None of the listed 
special or incentive pays is disbursed to a large enough 
population to warrant inclusion in a model for pay 
increases.  However, every service member rates all 
components of RMC; thus, RMC is used as the yardstick for 
compensation considerations. 
Throughout the first twenty years of the AVF, there was 
almost continual debate in the Congress over pay increases 
and the implementation of automatic adjustment mechanisms. 
Tensions often flaired as the nation's leaders came to 
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recognize that "competitive pay is the lifeblood of an 
all-volunteer force." (Philpott, September 27, 1993, p. 15) 
Because the AVF is forced to compete with private employers 
and colleges for eligible men and women, compensation 
incentives are vital for recruitment and retention.  While 
it is recognized that individuals do often enlist or 
reenlist for purposes other than money, it is apparent that 
...military pay would be most effective and 
efficient as a recruitment and retention tool if 
maintained over time at a level predictably 
attractive compared with civilian employment 
opportunities (7th QRMC, 1992, p. 109). 
The key problems center on how to determine if pay raises 
are required, whom to measure pay rates against, and how to 
apply adjustments once they are given.  These concerns 
resulted in numerous legislative acts that have affected the 
implementation and course of the AVF. 
The first major law that influenced the AVF 
compensation system was Public Law 90-207 (Act of December 
16, 1967).  Prior to enactment of Public Law 90-207, 
commonly called the Rivers Amendment, basic pay increases 
occurred solely at the discretion of the Congress.  They 
were erratic and irregular with no discernable pattern.  In 
fact, enlisted members with less than two years of service 
were not included in pay raises granted to other service 
members in 1955, 1958, 1963, and 1964.  This law was the 
first attempt to regulate pay increases for the military. 
It provided that whenever the federal General Schedule (GS) 
employees received a raise based upon white collar salaries, 
as measured by the annual survey of Professional, 
Administrative, Technical and Clerical (PATC) workers, the 
military would receive a comparable increase in RMC. 
Although the comparable raise was tied to RMC, the entire 
raise was given in basic pay alone.  This procedure required 
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the government to provide larger basic pay increases to the 
military services than those provided to the federal 
civilian sector, since basic pay accounted for only 75 
percent of RMC. 
Although Public Law 90-207 tied military pay raises 
automatically to pay raises for civil service workers, until 
the enactment of Public Law 91-656 (Federal Pay 
Comparability Act of 1970), there was no automatic pay 
adjustment for civilians either.  This law stipulated that 
GS rates be measured annually against comparable civilian 
sector jobs.  The President was required to ensure 
comparability through executive order by October 1st of each 
year.  Combined with the previous provisions of 1967, this 
law created the first truly "automatic" adjustments to 
military pay. (MCBP, 1987, p. 27) 
By 1974, the AVF was fully implemented.  Pay increases 
were still tied to RMC, but only applied to basic pay.  This 
system was not ideal because: 1) inflating basic pay had a 
corresponding impact on special and incentive (S&I) pays 
tied to basic pay; 2) not increasing BAQ and BAS tended to 
diminish the effect of a pay raise in combatting expenses in 
those areas; and 3) tax consequences required larger basic 
pay increases than what would be required if some increase 
were applied to the nontaxable allowances. (MCBP, 1987, pp. 
27-28)  Because of these conditions, the method of applying 
all of the pay raise only to basic pay was eliminated in 
Public Law 93-419 (Act of September 19, 1974) in favor of 
applying the pay rate percentage equally across the board to 
all three components of RMC (i.e., basic pay, BAQ, and BAS). 
In 1977, Public Law 94-361 (DoD Appropriation Act of 
1977) further changed the provisions of the automatic 
adjustment by allowing the President to change the way pay 
increases were applied.  Public Law 93-419 had required that 
pay increases occur in the same percentage for each of the 
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three RMC components.  The new law permitted the total 
increase to be applied among the three components at 
different percentage rates, provided it was "in the best 
interest of the Government." 
Public Law 96-342 (DoD Authorization Act of 1981) 
further changed the provisions of the automatic pay- 
adjustment.  There were two main effects of this law on pay: 
1) it suspended the tie imposed by Public Law 91-566 between 
the civilian sector and military pay raises; and 2) it 
allowed the President to distribute the basic pay increase 
by military pay grade and years-of-service.  These changes 
were made to enhance the pay for "career" personnel and to 
offer a larger pay increase than that provided for 
civilians.  This suspension of automatic pay provisions was 
the first of many.  Every year from 1983 until 1991, the 
automatic adjustment mechanisms were bypassed for special 
pay increases.  Virtually every year, Congress cited budget 
considerations or problems with the automatic adjustment 
mechanisms.  Several times in the early 1980s, Congress 
suggested that a new index be developed for more accurate 
comparability projections. (MCBP, 1991, pp. 35-3 6) 
The final major act affecting the AVF compensation 
adjustment mechanism was Public Law 101-159 (Federal 
Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990).  This 1990 act 
linked GS civilian pay increases with the Employment Cost 
Index (ECI).  The ECI is a measure of civilian labor costs 
as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Public Law 
101-159 required that GS pay increases be equal to the cost 
increases set by the ECI.  The law applied, in language, 
only to civilian pay.  However, the linkage between civilian 
and military pay established in 1967 created a military 
benefit as well.  The ECI has three advantages for the 
military over the previously-employed PATC survey. 
Initially, as Table 2-1 indicates, it is more reflective of 
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the military and of the broader U.S. economy.  Secondly, it 
is widely accepted by labor economists and compensation 
specialists as a relatively accurate indicator of changes in 
the labor market. (7th QRMC, 1992, p. 113)  Finally, the 
PATC, as suggested by the title, concentrates primarily on 
Table 2-1 
Comparison of PATC and ECI Indexes 
Coverage PATC ECI 
Military Jobs 
-Enlisted 10% 71% 
-Officer 50% 67% 
Total 12% 70% 







Source:  From Military Manpower Task Force; A Report to the 
President on the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer 
Force, 1982, p. IV-3. 
white-collar occupations.  As Table 2-1 shows, the PATC 
actually covered only 12 percent of military occupations. 
Pay adjustments are still linked to the ECI, though a 
1992 study by the RAND Corporation has questioned continued 
use of the index to adjust military pay.  Table 2-2 
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highlights some of the problems cited by RAND in its report, 
The disparities are obvious.  The ECI was developed in the 
early 1970s as "an indicator of changes in employers' labor 
costs." (Department of Labor, 1990, p. 1)  It was not 
designed for comparisons between the military and civilian 
job markets.  The demographics of a younger military 
Table 2-2 
Comparison of Percentage Surveyed by ECI and the Military 
Composition of Selected Demographic Categories 
Category Military ECI 
Age 26 or younger 55 22 
Age 42 or older 5 33 
College degree or some college 
education 
20 43 
Source:  Adapted from Tom Philpott, "The Science of 
Measuring Pay," Air Force Times, September 23, 1993, p. 16 
population do not fit into the ECI survey analysis. 
Although superior to the previously-employed PATC, the ECI 
still does not encompass the military's demographics.  In 
response to this disparity, RAND and the 7th QRMC Committee 
proposed a new Defense Employment Cost Index (DECI) to 
better compare civilian and military pay increases. (7th 
QRMC, 1992, p. 113)  As of 1994, the DECI was still under 
review and not applicable to this study.  However, it is 
clear that the ECI is deficient in comparing military 
compensation rates with civilian occupations.  Throughout 
the years of the AVF, each of the automatic adjustment 
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mechanisms have had considerable impact on the largest 
component of RMC, basic pay.  From the beginning of the AVF, 
the automatic adjustment mechanism has been used to attempt 
to maintain military pay at appropriate levels. 
Based upon recommendations of the Gates Commission, 
Congress approved a 14.2 percent pay raise for the military 
on November 14, 1971.  After this raise, "the 1972 annual 
report submitted to Congress...on the adequacy of military 
pay and allowances stated [the pay increase had] 'raised 
military pay to reasonably competitive levels for the first 
time in recent history'...." (MCBP, 1987, p. 35)  Table 2-3 
contains data on the cumulative effect of annual pay raises 
and cumulative increases in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
against which pay increases were being measured.  The table 
clearly illustrates a problem with the ability of RMC to 
keep pace with inflationary price increases.  For example, 
in October 1979, the military received a pay increase of 7 
percent.  The cumulative effect of pay increases from 
October 1972 until October 1979 totalled 59.6 percent. 
However, over that same period, the cumulative increase in 
the CPI was 81.5 percent.  A comparison of the two measures 
shows that RMC lagged behind CPI by 21.9 percentage points 
over the sample period. 
Gaps of up to 45.9 percent in the late 1970s and early 
1980s contributed to problems in personnel retention during 
that period.  By FY 1979, all services had also missed their 
recruiting goals for the first time since implementation of 
the AVF.  The exodus of career personnel combined with 
recruiting problems "led to a reduced readiness posture in 
all services." (Grosz, 1983, p. 10)  The pay raises of 1981 
and 1982, combined with the President's authorization to 
redistribute pay increases under the DoD Authorization Act 
of 1981, assisted in bringing career retention rates back to 
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Table 2-3 


















Nov 1971 14.2 - - - 
Jan 1972 5.4 - - - 
Oct 1972 6.0 6.0 2.5 3.5 
Oct 1973 7.3 13.7 10.1 3.6 
Oct 1974 5.5 20.0 23.3 -3.3 
Oct 1975 5.0 26.0 32.9 -6.9 
Oct 1976 4.8 32.0 40.2 -8.2 
Oct 1977 7.1 41.4 49.5 -8.1 
Oct 1978 5.5 49.2 61.9 -12.7 
Oct 1979 7.0 59.6 81.5 -21.9 
Oct 1980 12.7 78.3 104.5 -26.2 
Oct 1981 14.3 103.8 127.0 -23.2 
Oct 1982 4.0 112.0 138.4 -26.4 
Jan 1984 4.0 120.5 145.3 -24.8 
Jan 1985 4.0 129.3 156.6 -27.3 
Oct 1985 3.0 136.1 163.8 -27.7 
Jan 1987 3.0 143.2 168.5 -25.3 
Jan 1988 2.0 148.1 180.2 -32.1 
Jan 1989 4.1 158.3 191.9 -33.6 
Jan 1990 3.6 167.6 205.5 -37.9 
Jan 1991 4.1 178.5 224.4 -45.9 
Source: Adapted 
L991,   p. 
from Military Comp ensation Background 
Papers,   ] 43. 
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acceptable levels.  Table 2-4 illustrates the changes in 
career retention rates. 
Basic pay rates were not only tied to retention, but to 
recruiting as well.  A 1978 study conducted for the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) found a positive pay 
elasticity between pay increases and high-quality recruits. 
The study concluded that a 10 percent increase in pay led to 
a 5-10 percent increase in the quality of recruits, as 
determined by educational level, aptitude test scores, and 
the incidence of disciplinary violations.  (DoD, 1978, pp. 
3,56)  An increase in recruit quality is an anticipated 
effect of the AVF.  David Henderson felt the AVF could 
result in higher quality since it relies on and rewards 
individuals on the basis of self-selection. (Henderson, 
1988, p. 25)  In fact, the early statistics from the AVF 
supported his contention.  The OSD report stated that while 
the draft forces had contained 5 percent more accessions in 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) categories I and II, 
they had also contained three times as many AFQT category IV 
recruits. (DoD, 1978, p. 166) 
By 1990, pay raises were no longer tied to the PATC 
survey but rather to the ECI for reasons previously 
discussed.  The pay gap continued to be measured against the 
CPI as indicated in Table 2-3.  Pay increases were also 
measured against the ECI, and by the early 1990s the gap 
according to this measure had grown to 11.8 percent. 
(Philpott, September 27, 1993, p. 14)  Despite the large pay 
differential witnessed through the CPI and smaller, yet 
persistent, ECI gaps, the armed forces did not experience 
the substantial departure of personnel that occurred in the 
late 1970s.  In fact, a massive force drawdown was initiated 
as the Cold War ended and the Nation sought to achieve a 
"peace dividend."  To encourage voluntary departures of 
military personnel,  Congress enacted a number of 
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incentives, namely the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) 
and the Selective Separation Bonus (SSB).  The military also 
resorted to forced retirements through Selective Early 
Retirement Boards and other means of separating personnel in 
the attempt to meet drawdown requirements.  Military leaders 
were placed in a difficult position—defending increases in 
compensation to recruit and retain high-quality personnel 
while simultaneously seeking monetary incentive programs 
that would entice service members to leave the armed forces. 
An inevitable question was raised: "If military compensation 
is so bad, why are people not leaving?" (Philpott, September 
27, 1993, p. 14)  This situation focused attention on the 
Table 2-4 
DoD Reenlistment Rates (Percent) by Category, FY 1973-1982 
Category 1973 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
First-term 24 37 37 37 39 43 52 
Career 83 81 71 68 70 76 82 
Source:  From Military Manpower Task Force: A Report to the 
President on the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer 
Force, 1982, p. III-3. 
use of automatic adjustments to military pay.  Are military 
members truly underpaid as suggested by the adjustment 
indexes, or is there some element of compensation that has 
been overlooked?  The impact of the automatic pay adjustment 
was not limited to basic pay alone.  The effects of the 
adjustment were reflected in the second largest component of 
RMC, allowances, as well. 
The military compensation system has a unique feature 
not found in civilian systems, namely allowances. 
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Allowances result from the historical need to feed and house 
service members.  Over the years, these allowances have 
shifted from the original in-kind provisions to expected and 
relied-upon monetary payments.  Two allowances, BAS and BAQ, 
are summarized below as a part of RMC. 
Basic allowance for subsistence is provided to 
alleviate the expense that service members incur to feed 
themselves, if not fed by the government.  As stated in the 
Military Compensation Background Papers, "...both officer 
and enlisted subsistence allowances were at first intended 
to be a cash equivalent of the approximate raw food cost to 
the Government of feeding its military personnel." (MCBP, 
1991, p. 107)  The allowance was first established in 1949 
with the Career Compensation Act and has remained in effect 
with few changes.  The 7th QRMC identified three problems 
with the BAS system. 
Initially, BAS is not related to the cost of food, 
which is in direct conflict with the intended purpose.  The 
problem centers on the automatic mechanisms used to adjust 
pay.  Initially, no adjustments were made to the BAS 
allowance.  In 1974, Public Law 93-419 changed adjustment 
procedures to permit equal applications of pay increases to 
all components of RMC.  Increases were then applied to BAS 
based upon labor cost surveys, not on food cost surveys. 
Secondly, the system is not equitable.  Fiscal 1991 provides 
a good example.  The daily food cost to feed a member that 
year was $4.90.  Therefore, the in-kind value to those 
service members provided subsistence was $4.90 per day. 
However, the most common BAS rate in 1991 was $6.15 for 
enlisted personnel and $4.30 for officers per day.  Enlisted 
members were consequently being paid BAS, on average, in 
excess of the daily cost-to-feed and more than their 
counterparts eating in the chow hall.  Conversely, officers 
were being paid less, on average, in both situations. 
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Additionally, officers have to pay a surcharge to subsist in 
the chow halls, which further erodes their allowance.  At 
the same time, enlisted personnel who rate BAS must forfeit 
their allowance under certain situations, such as war or 
field duty—which removes anticipated money from their 
families and may cause domestic financial problems.  This 
example of inconsistency in applying BAS raises another 
issue, namely that the system is too complex, with too many 
different rates and entitlements, to ensure proper 
understanding and equity. (7th QRMC, 1992, pp. 61-63) 
A similar allowance provided for the cost of quarters 
is BAQ.  Basic allowance for quarters is designed to provide 
monetary compensation for service members to obtain housing 
in the civilian market, if not provided housing by the 
government.  The history of housing entitlements dates back 
to the origin of the military.  However, the basic structure 
of BAQ was set with the Career Compensation Act of 1949. 
This allowance has suffered many of the same problems as BAS 
in relation to the automatic adjustment mechanisms.  But, 
BAQ has one major advantage.  The Military Personnel and 
Compensation Amendments of 1980 to Public Law 96-343 created 
the VHA, or Variable Housing Allowance, which compensates 
for housing costs in different areas.  The VHA is reviewed 
regularly and adjusted to ensure that service members are 
not affected by price variations between locations.  The 
intent is for housing allowances to be "site-neutral" and to 
provide service members with the same opportunities for 
housing regardless of duty station. (7th QRMC, 1992, p. 67) 
The BAQ mechanism has worked better than BAS, but 
problems still exist with respect to equity.  The 1991 Joint 
Services Housing Allowance Study found that service members 
have to pay 20 percent of their housing expenses from pay 
other than BAQ and VHA.  This amounts to a 20-percent 
inequity for personnel who live in civilian housing as 
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compared with their counterparts who have government- 
provided quarters. (7th QRMC, 1992, p. 67)  A second problem 
exists for junior enlisted personnel who cannot acquire 
adequate housing based on their entitlements.  The current 
review mechanism places them in a vicious cycle.  The VHA 
rates are based upon actual housing expenditures.  Junior 
enlisted personnel can only spend the money they have, which 
limits their ability to acquire adequate housing.  The VHA 
will not be raised until they spend more, but they cannot 
spend more until the VHA is raised.  The problem is that 
"the current methodology for setting VHA rates does not 
incorporate a physical standard for adequate housing." (7th 
QRMC, 1992, p. 68) 
B.  CHANGES IN VETERANS' ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
Throughout the almost 50 years since World War II, 
Congress has enacted a series of programs to assist service 
members in their return to civilian life.  The nation 
recognized that integrating veterans into the societal 
mainstream benefitted both the country and the individual. 
The "GI Bill of Rights" was established after World War II 
for two main purposes: 1) to provide readjustment assistance 
to returning veterans; and 2) to compensate veterans for 
their "lost time" while in the military.  When the draft 
ended in 1973, military manpower officials recognized that 
GI Bill benefits, especially educational assistance, were 
also important in attracting the voluntary service of 
high-quality recruits.  By this time, educational benefits 
had thus taken on the added role of being an enlistment 
incentive as well as a way of assisting less-advantaged 
veterans with their college expenses.  Thus, veterans' 
educational programs were established to: 1) enhance 
military service; 2) provide educational benefits to service 
26 
members who might not otherwise afford it; 3) assist 
veterans to acquire opportunities lost through military- 
service; and 4) help those individuals who would have 
pursued an educational option had they not served. (MCBP, 
1991, p. 633) 
The value of potential educational assistance cannot be 
over-emphasized when recruiting for an AVF.  A study by the 
U. S. Army Research Institute in FY 1982 found that recruits 
who scored in the top two categories on the AFQT enlisted 
primarily for college money (-35 percent) and skill training 
(-25 percent). (Thurman, 1986, p. 273)  Approximately 60 
percent of the Army's high-quality enlistees that year 
joined for reasons that were directly related to these 
programs.  Other studies have validated these results on the 
effectiveness of assistance programs in military recruiting. 
A 1982 RAND study reported that the Army College Fund 
produced a 9-percent increase in high-quality accessions 
during fiscal 1981.  The introduction of generous 
educational programs creates a dilemma for the military: 
although these programs are effective as recruiting 
incentives, their main benefits are usually used after a 
service member leaves the armed forces.  The advantage in 
recruiting could thus be offset by an adverse effect on 
retention. (Hosek et al., 1984, p. 25)  In fact, a 1991 
study by Hogan, Smith, and Sylvester on the Army College 
Fund supports the hypothesis of adverse retention effects. 
(Hogan et al., 1991, pp. 338-341) This is why po_st-service 
educational benefits are also described as a "disincentive" 
for reenlistment. 
Following in the tradition of previous "GI Bills," 
Public Law 89-358 (Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 
1966) provided educational assistance allowances for 
veterans of the Cold War and Southeast Asia hostilities. 
Entitlements were determined by the member's length of 
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service and character of discharge.  Generally, the benefit 
provided up to 3 6 months of assistance at secondary schools, 
colleges, vocational schools, apprenticeships, or other 
on-the-job training. 
Public Law 93-508 (Vietnam Veterans' Readjustment 
Assistance Act of 1974) extended the GI Bill until January 
1, 1977.  The provisions were basically the same as the 
previous legislation, except that entitlements were now also 
determined by the number of the member's dependents and the 
type of training the member was receiving.  Assistance 
increased for veterans who pursued full-time programs and 
had dependents.  The most significant aspect of this law is 
the definitive ending date.  Many people felt the GI Bill 
made a significant contribution to the quality of the AVF 
and wanted to retain the program.  General Maxwell R. 
Thurman, for example, stated that "with the GI Bill went 
smart high school graduates who gave us the quality needed 
to perform the Army's mission and to sustain the strong 
backbone of the NCO corps." (Thurman, 1986, p. 269) 
Although "quality" is difficult to define, statistical 
evidence generally supports his assertions. (Brehm, 1982, p. 
154) 
By 197 6, Congress recognized what many other military 
supporters already knew--mainly "...that education 
incentives drew smart, college-bound or college-capable 
soldiers." (Thurman, 1986, p. 271)  To meet this need, the 
GI Bill was replaced with the "Post-Vietnam Era Veterans' 
Educational Assistance Program" (through Public Law 94-502) . 
Commonly called VEAP, the new program created a 
"contributory" benefit whereby the Government would match 
service member contributions on a $2 for $1 basis.  The 
member could contribute a maximum of $2,700 and gain a 
return of $8,100 (when matched with a government 
contribution of $5,400) to use on the same basic programs 
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covered under the old GI Bill.  Substantial increases in 
assistance were also made available through "kickers" for 
persons who enlisted in certain occupations and met other 
specific criteria.  For example, up to $20,100 was available 
through various "kickers" in the Army College Fund. 
Congress made no attempt to disguise the two major 
forces driving the creation of VEAP.  First, was the 
budgetary concern of the assistance programs being provided. 
The GI Bill was costing the government about $3 billion 
annually and was estimated to have a steady-state cost of $1 
billion per year under the AVF.  The estimated cost of VEAP 
was far less and transferred a portion of the budgetary 
burden to the DoD.  Second, by Congress' specific language, 
VEAP was expected "to promote and assist the all-volunteer 
military program of the United States by attracting 
qualified men and women to serve in the Armed Forces." 
(MCBP, 1987, p. 535)  By most accounts, VEAP did not 
accomplish the latter objective.  After several attempts at 
modification, it was finally abandoned in 1985 and replaced 
with the "Montgomery GI Bill." 
Included in the DoD Authorization Act of 1985, Public 
Law 98-525 was the Veterans' Education Assistance Act of 
1984, which encompassed active duty and reserve forces.  The 
active duty program, titled "All-Volunteer Force Educational 
Assistance Program," is commonly referred to as the 
"Montgomery GI Bill," after its Congressional sponsor, 
Representative G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery.  This is a 
contributory program that requires members, enlisting after 
June 30, 1985, to pay $100 per-month during their first year 
of active duty.  All contributions to the program are 
nonrefundable, a major change from VEAP. However, the 
benefits are substantially superior to VEAP.  Under the 
Montgomery GI Bill, service members can receive up to $300 
per month for 36 months, or $10,800 for a $1,200 
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contribution.  The Secretary of Defense can approve 
additional benefits of up to $700 per month for hard-to-fill 
specialties and for eligible members who reenlist for 
additional service. 
C.  CHANGES IN SPECIAL AND INCENTIVE PAYS 
Special and Incentive pays for the U.S. military date 
to 1791, when enlistment and reenlistment bonuses were first 
offered.  Initially, these pays were designed to compensate 
service members who were exposed to more than the normal 
amount of hazardous conditions.  Title 37, chapter 5 of the 
U.S. Code defines these pays by three groups: incentive, 
special, and bonuses.  These groupings provide no real 
indication of the purpose of the pay.  The 7th QRMC 
regrouped S&I pays in three categories: hazardous duty, 
career incentive, and skill incentive.  These categories are 
based upon their underlying intent (i.e., to reward exposure 
to hazardous duty, retain members with career potential, and 
retain members with desirable skills).  The listing is 
contained in Appendix B.  The QRMC groupings indicate how 
the purpose of S&I pays have changed over the years. 
Instead of compensating for exposure to hazardous duty, they 
now "are focused on providing additional incentives to 
members of the armed forces to enter certain career fields 
that would, without those incentives, experience manning 
shortfalls."  (MCBP, 1991, p. 147) 
In 1984, the 5th QRMC studied S&I pays in great detail. 
With the exception of four special pays, it validated the 
need and effectiveness of the payments.  The commission 
specifically cited the need to retain flexibility with S&I 
pays for the services to properly manage supply and demand 
conditions. (5th QRMC, 1984, p. VI-2)  Again, in 1992, S&I 
payments were studied by the 7th QRMC.  This time the 
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Commission highlighted the potential of S&I pays to manage 
the experience level and technical expertise of the AVF. 
Unfortunately, the 7th QRMC found "little evidence of 
coordinated service and OSD management" and concluded that 
the payments were managed "on an ad-hoc basis." (7th QRMC, 
1992, p. 96)  In fact, the average time between incentive 
adjustments was 6 to 10 years, with proportional adjustments 
of 10 to 180 percent.  This neglect towards S&I pays clearly 
detracts from their effectiveness and flexibility in meeting 
labor market changes. (7th QRMC, 1992, p. 97) 
One or more S&I pays are paid to 43.1 percent of active 
duty service members.  The pays comprise 4.8 percent of 
total cash compensation.  Combined with basic pay and 
allowances, S&I pays form the major components of the 
military compensation system. (7th QRMC, 1992, p. 95)  Table 
2-5 shows the six largest (by number of recipients) and 
best-known pays.  The role of these and other S&I pays is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, which centers 
on the role of labor market considerations in establishing 
the military compensation system. 
Table 2-5 
Top Six S&I Pays for Officers and Enlisted Personnel by 
Number of Recipients, FY 1992 
iB^BäejöSfillil: karges« ':'"• 2nd 3rd 4 th Sth £th 
Officers Aviation Medical Medical Career Aviator Medical 
(164,641) Career Officer Officer Sea Pay Contin- Officer 
Incentive Variable Additional (9,356) uation Pay Cert ifi- 
Pay Special Pay Special Pay (7,361) cation Pay 
(72,008) (13,910) (10,285) (6,406) 
Enlisted Selective Career Certain Special Enlistment Submarine 
(777,268) Reenlist- Sea Pay Places Pay Duty Bonus Duty Pay 
ment Bonus (146,240) (103,876) Assignment (36,746) (36,013) 
(260,518) Pay 
(56,574) 
Source:  From 7th QRMC, 1992, p. 95, 
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D.  LESSONS LEARNED 
1. Wage Comparability Surveys are Inaccurate 
There have been no wage comparability surveys conducted 
over the past twenty years that accurately reflect all the 
jobs of the armed forces.  Initially, the PATC had too 
narrow a base and focused primarily on white-collar jobs. 
The military has a wide occupational base and is mainly blue 
collar.  The use of the ECI appeared more reflective of the 
military than the PATC.  It surveyed a larger segment of the 
population and more military jobs, but it had problems 
with certain demographic factors such as age and education. 
Finally, the unique combat requirements imposed upon all 
service members make accurate comparisons difficult.  There 
is no way to quantify the so-called X-factor, or to obtain 
an accurate assessment of the compensatory requirements. 
2. Automatic Wage Adjustments are Poorly Executed 
Accurate, reliable, and timely pay adjustments are 
desirable goals for military members and their supporters 
because 
a clearly articulated, rational policy for making 
annual pay adjustments could avoid uncertainty and 
misunderstanding by those most affected by the 
decisions--the military members (7th QRMC, 1992, 
p. Ill). 
Historically, however, automatic wage adjustments have been 
haphazard and poorly executed.  The initial and most obvious 
problem, as discussed above, is how to measure wage 
differences.  If an accurate mechanism could be developed, 
the next problem is proper application of the adjustments to 
compensation components.  Throughout the first twenty years 
of the AVF, the methodology of arbitrarily applying raises 
to all components of RMC was not appropriate.  There were 
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two adverse effects of this method of wage adjustment. 
First, it removed the link between BAS and BAQ and their 
intended purposes of defraying food and housing 
costs,respectively.  Second, it created a sense of inequity 
in the federal compensation system. 
3. Intent of Allowances is Good 
The intent of BAS and BAQ is good.  However, the 
adjustment mechanisms and their inherent complexities make 
these allowances less effective as compensation incentives. 
The universal application of wage adjustments removed the 
connection between the allowances and the expenses they are 
supposed to defray.  By not considering the cost of food and 
housing during some pay adjustments, the allowances shift 
with no relation to actual costs.  This creates inequities 
within the compensation system that are difficult to 
overcome. 
4. Compensation Initiatives Affect Retention and 
Recruiting 
Compensation initiatives do affect retention and 
recruiting efforts.  During the late 1970s, military 
compensation was allowed to erode.  Most noticeable was the 
lag in relative wage rates and the replacement of the GI 
Bill with the less generous VEAP.  Consequently, the quality 
of new recruits suffered and reenlistment rates plummeted. 
Exit surveys conducted in 1979 and 1980, for the 1982 
Military Pay Adjustment Mechanism Study, "identified 
dissatisfaction with compensation as the single most 
important factor in the decision to leave the service." 
(Grosz, 1983, p. 10)  Recognition of these economic factors 
and the need for both fair and competitive compensation led 
to major pay increases for the AVF in the early 1980s. 
These pay raises are credited with restoring recruit quality 
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and career reenlistment rates to acceptable levels. 
Maintaining compensation packages that are competitive with 
opportunities in the civilian sector will help to sustain 
the AVF. 
5.  Educational Benefits Affect Both Recruiting and 
Personnel Turnover 
Post-service educational benefits are a dual-edged 
sword.  That is, they are both an incentive for enlistment 
as well as a disincentive for reenlistment.  These benefits 
encourage college-capable or "college-bound" applicants to 
enlist in the armed forces to obtain post-service 
educational assistance.  Conversely, the same benefits 
encourage individuals to leave the military and pursue 
post-service education.  Compensation specialists must 
recognize the dual nature of these programs, determine the 
desired impact, and tailor educational programs to enhance 
recruiting or retention efforts. 
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III.  MARKET OR INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
From the earliest days of the AVF, there have been 
basically two concepts that have dominated discussions of 
military compensation.  These are the "institutional" and 
"market" approaches.  Military compensation has been 
influenced primarily by institutional considerations 
throughout most of American history.  However, since 
implementation of the AVF in 1973, the military has relied 
primarily upon the competitive labor market to obtain 
military personnel. (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, pp. 6-7)  The 
combination of institutional pay considerations in a market 
environment has resulted in a complex system of 
compensation.  Some commentators, such as Charles Moskos, 
argue in behalf of the institutional approach, finding 
serious problems in methods of military compensation that 
are dominated by market dynamics.  Proponents of each 
approach are equally persuasive and adamant in presenting 
their position.  This chapter explores institutional and 
market concepts and their role in the AVF compensation 
program. 
A.  INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
This approach is based upon the concept "that members 
of an institution are motivated primarily by a sense of 
identity with an organization." (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, 
p. 14)  Moskos defines an institution 
...in terms of values and norms...a purpose 
transcending individual self-interest in favor of 
a higher good.  Members [of the military]...are 
often seen as following a calling...as being 
different or apart from the broader 
society...(Moskos, 1978, p. 31). 
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Supporters of the institutional approach believe that 
military members of the AVF should feel this separation and 
special calling.  Instead of being paid entirely in market- 
driven monetary wages, they should also serve for the 
institutional benefits of respect and for other social 
advantages.  Their commitment is thus grounded in the 
institutional values of "duty," "honor," and "country"; and 
military service is a "way of life," not a "job." (5th QRMC, 
1984, p. 1-3) 
Military service is based on numerous institutional 
concepts. The unique conditions of the X-factor, described 
in Chapter I, apply here.  Service members are exposed to 
overseas tours, family separations, enlistment contracts, 
twenty-four-hour duty, frequent family moves, and military 
discipline and law.  Complete submission to orders of 
superiors and the constant possibility of combat action 
heighten the member's commitment to the institution. 
Military service requires commitment and loyalty from all 
service members, regardless of job specialty.  As noted in a 
1986 GAO report, "in exchange for military personnel 
accepting this unlimited liability contract, military 
leaders believe that they have a moral and ethical 
responsibility to care adequately for them and their 
families." (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, p. 9) 
Military compensation is not the result of individual 
expertise, but rather "a function of rank, seniority, and 
need." (Moskos, 1978, p. 32)  The "need" factor is a basic 
institutionalist concept, where more is provided to those 
who have greater need.  In fact, it is estimated that close 
to 40 percent of total military earnings is based on factors 
other than job performance.  Other factors include marital 
and dependency status, availability of government 
facilities, and deferred income. (Binkin, 1975, p. 37) 
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Institutionalists argue that all  service members are 
subject to the same national defense responsibilities. 
In-service occupational specialties may vary from member to 
member, but the expectations from the nation are essentially 
the same for all persons in the military.  Therefore, all 
members of the same rank and experience should be paid the 
same amount for their service.  This concept is the 
foundation of the military basic pay system.  With minor 
exceptions, all pay raises during the years of the AVF have 
been applied universally to all members of the armed forces. 
The military places high value on the welfare of its 
members and has developed a compensation system described as 
highly "paternalistic." (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, p. 9)  That 
is, the compensation system includes noncash provision of 
food and housing or nontaxable allowances in lieu of these 
goods.  These allowances are based on the "need" concept 
prevalent throughout the institutionalist philosophy.  The 
proponents argue that, only by adequately caring for each 
member on the basis of individual needs, can the nation 
secure a committed and capable military force.  The 
institutionalist dogma is best explained through different 
BAQ rates for married and single service members.  Married 
members, on the basis of additional dependents, need a 
larger BAQ allowance to secure adequate accommodations for 
their dependents.  It is believed that the needs of the 
single member do not require as large an allowance because 
single persons need to secure lodging only for themselves. 
The highly paternalistic and needs-oriented nature of 
the institutionalist philosophy is seen to include 
subsidized shopping on military installations, recreational 
activities, health care, annual leave provisions, survivor 
benefits, and deferred compensation through retirement 
benefits, as examples.  Individual service members place 
different values on each of these benefits, which could be 
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substantially higher or lower than the cost incurred by the 
armed forces to provide the services.  However, the 
institutionalist philosophy prefers to provide such services 
for the welfare of military members and their families. 
There are several advantages in the institutionalist 
approach to compensation.  Initially, the so called 
X-factor, or the unusual, nonquantifiable demands of 
military life, has always been difficult to define and 
compensate.  Under the institutional approach, no monetary 
remuneration is specifically required for this factor. 
There is a recognition that life is different within the 
armed forces; and every individual is compensated, equally 
and without special consideration of military demands, for 
his or her commitment to the organization. 
Moreover, institutionalists believe the compensation 
system should be used to enhance the relationship between 
the organization and the service member.  Under this 
approach, members are supposed to gain goal commitment, 
increased morale, and unit cohesion.  These intangibles of 
service apply, in both war and peace, and strengthen the 
overall functioning of the armed forces.  The loss of 
commitment, morale, and cohesion could diminish combat 
effectiveness. 
Finally, there is one basic pay scale under the 
institutional philosophy.  All service members are 
recognized to have equal responsibilities to the 
institution.  By maintaining one pay scale, it is believed 
that shared commitment and goal congruence can be 
encouraged; furthermore, equal pay ensures that equal value 
is placed on the commitment of each member to the nation's 
defense. 
The institutionalist approach also has some 
disadvantages.  As noted, the paternalistic practice of 
providing more benefits to married members than to single 
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members is a direct outgrowth of the institutionalist 
philosophy of "need."  It is true, generally, that married 
members incur greater costs than do single members. 
However, the practice does create impressions of inequity 
when members with the same grade, time-in-service, and 
specialty, are provided different benefits strictly on the 
basis of dependency status.  Such a system provides "unequal 
pay for equal work."  Table 3-1 contains Binkin's 
demonstration of this concept.  Although the analysis 
reflects pay in 1975, the point remains valid to this day. 
Institutionalists favor a compensation system that includes 
elements based on the need of the service member (GAO/NSIAD- 
86-11, 1986, p. 14), even though this may create the 
appearance of inequity for single members.  As seen in Table 
3-1, a married sergeant in the mid-1970s was compensated an 
additional 14.6 percent over his single counterpart. 
A second major disadvantage is automatic 
time-in-service pay adjustments.  Adjustments to the basic 
pay scales are made on the basis of grade and longevity. 
Institutionalists support longevity increases because they 
reward "long and faithful service." (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, 
p. 49)  These increases are not correlated with productivity 
or performance.  The poor and stellar performers all rate 
the same pay adjustments.  This system has opened the 
compensation program to scrutiny and criticism.  However, it 
is defended on the basis of equity and fairness across 
inter-Service lines.  Each Service has different promotion 
opportunities, and institutionalists believe that military 
members should not be penalized if the promotion 
opportunities are slower in one Service as opposed to 
another. (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, p. 50) 
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Table 3-1 
Comparison of Estimated Compensation in 1974 for an 
Unmarried and a Married Sergeant (E-5) with Four Years of 
Military Service, Receiving Cash Quarters and Subsistence 
Allowances 
Compensation Element 
























Source:  From Martin Binkin, The Military Pay Muddle, 1975, 
p. 38. 
B.  MARKET APPROACH 
The market approach1 to compensation management 
centers on the mechanisms of supply and demand in the labor 
market.  Warner identified four distinguishing 
characteristics of the  approach: efficiency, response to 
incentives, consumer preferences, and current value of 
compensation. (Warner, 1983, pp. 23-24) 
Economists believe that a fundamental goal of the 
compensation system should be to obtain the correct mix of 
JThis approach has also been called the occupational or 
economic method. 
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personnel at the lowest possible cost.  Therefore, the 
compensation system should be targeted to obtain the 
required number of personnel in each occupation.  Different 
occupations have separate supply and demand elasticities 
that must be recognized to obtain personnel at the lowest 
cost.  The market philosophy argues against across-the-board 
pay raises, which overcompensate some occupations while 
undercompensating others.  Such raises are seen as totally 
inefficient and expensive in economic terms. 
Proponents of the market approach contend that 
monetary and nonpecuniary incentives can make a difference 
in military enlistment and retention rates.  Numerous 
studies have supported their beliefs. 
Diversity of consumer preferences for goods and 
services implies that individuals do not place the same 
value on nonpecuniary benefits.  Therefore, different 
service members do not necessarily gain equal benefit from 
these expenditures.  Similarly, the government may not gain 
complete financial advantage for nonpecuniary benefits with 
respect to their cash equivalent.  This condition, according 
to market theory, suggests that the compensation system 
should concentrate on cash incentives that have equal value 
among all members. 
Warner observes that military personnel "prefer current 
dollars to future dollars...." (Warner, 1983, p. 24) 
Nothing demonstrates this observation better than the 
military's experience with its incentive programs for 
downsizing the force in the early 1990s.  Military planners 
originally estimated that 38 percent of eligible personnel 
would accept the VSI (future money) buyout and that 62 
percent would select the SSB (current money) option.  The 
DoD budget for out-years was based upon these estimates. 
However, demonstrating the validity of this economic theory, 
the actual percentages were significantly different: 15 
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percent of personnel opted for the VSI and 85 percent took 
the SSB.  The implication here is that the effectiveness of 
monetary incentives depends largely upon their perceived 
value in current dollars—although there were large 
differences in the choice of VSI or SSB by enlisted 
personnel and officers (with officers more likely to take 
the VSI). 
The economic characteristics identified by Warner are 
applicable in labor discussions.  However, labor economists 
recognize that the labor market can be more complicated than 
traditional economic markets that work exclusively on supply 
and demand.  The conditions of employment, or nonpecuniary 
factors, are often more important to employment decisions 
for potential workers than are the offered wages.  Labor 
economists stipulate that "...a host of institutions and 
pieces of legislation that influence the employment 
relationship do not exist in other markets." (Ehrenberg and 
Smith, 1991, p. 2) 
Identification of labor market influences are vital to 
ensure adequate manning and force shaping.  In fact, many of 
the factors that affect staffing of the armed forces are 
legislated by Congress and create special labor market 
considerations.  Ehrenberg and Smith state that "when a 
formal set of rules and procedures guides and constrains the 
employment relationship within  a firm, an internal   labor 
market  is said to exist." (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991, p. 22) 
The armed forces have an internal labor market.  An internal 
labor market is distinct from an external market, in that 
the external market is governed purely by market forces. 
The internal market requires filling entry positions from 
outside the organization, but all upper-level positions are 
filled from within the firm. 
The concept of an internal labor market is consistent 
with the military's closed manpower system, previously 
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discussed in Chapter II.  Once employed within an internal 
labor market, the individual is considered safe from outside 
competitive market forces.  Furthermore, the individual has 
the capability to compete for promotions within the 
organization that are often based upon seniority and not 
ability.  "This model [internal labor market] appears to 
capture many of the realities of the military personnel 
situation." (Roth, 1987, p. 28) 
One of the earliest examples of the market approach to 
compensation is enlistment bonuses.  The origins of 
enlistment bonuses or "bounties" can be traced to 1791 and 
the earliest efforts to raise the nation's armed forces. 
The first bounties were institutional in nature, as they 
were paid to all recruits who enlisted for service.  During 
the Civil War, unsavory individuals perfected the art of 
"bounty jumping."  Men would accept a bounty--and then 
desert, only to collect another bounty in a different state. 
These actions led to the termination of enlistment bonuses 
after the Civil War. 
Public Law 92-129 (The Military Selective Service Act 
Amendments of 1971) revived enlistment bonuses with a new 
market philosophy.  The new bonus program encouraged 
enlistment in "combat arms" for a payment of $1,500.  The 
combat arms limitation was removed with Public Law 93-277 
(The Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act of 
1974) .  The 1974 regulation required only that persons 
enlist for a period of at least four years in a "critical" 
field.  The bonuses were provided in lump-sum payments. 
Throughout the 1974-1993 period, numerous legislative 
acts have extended the bonus program and raised the amount 
of the bonuses authorized.  The only other significant 
change to the program occurred in 1981 under Public Law 96- 
342 (DoD Authorization Act of 1981).  This law provided that 
enlistment bonuses be offered with an initial partial 
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payment and "the remainder paid in equal periodic 
installments payable not less frequently than once every 
three months." (MCBP, 1991, p. 392) 
Table 3-2 contains cost data for the enlistment bonus 
program from 1972-1990.  Four points of interest deserve 
special consideration.  Initially, the huge jump in numbers 
and cost from 1972 to 1973 reflects the end of conscription 
and the need for the Army and Marine Corps to fill their 
"combat" specialties.  Second, the years 1977-1980 have 
previously been identified as a problem for the military, as 
military pay lagged against the CPI and the GI Bill was 
terminated.  Table 3-2 indicates that there was no effort 
made to attract personnel to critical fields during this 
time through bonuses.  Third, the Services made extensive 
use of bonuses from 1983-1986.  Table 2-3 previously 
demonstrated that RMC continued to lose ground against the 
CPI during this period.  However, Table 3-2 indicates that 
heavy use was made of this program to ensure the proper 
number and caliber of personnel were recruited to fill 
critical billets.  Finally, although the total numbers and 
maximum authorizations have changed significantly, it can be 
seen in Table 3-2 that the average cost-per-individual has 
not significantly changed over the 19-year time period. 
The 5th QRMC studied enlistment bonuses in great detail 
and determined that enlistment bonuses were "an appropriate 
managerial tool for channeling quality individuals into 
critically undermanned skills." (5th QRMC, 1983, p. 415) 
Additionally, a study of 1980 enlistment bonus recipients in 
the Army found that these personnel stayed in the service 
longer than nonrecipients by an average of 1.2 years.  Thus, 
despite the bonus payment, recipients had a lower training 
cost-per-year than did non-bonus enlistees.  By using 
bonuses to target 14,858 high-quality enlistees, the 
Commission consequently estimated that the Army alone saved 
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Table 3-2 









1972 1,022 1,533 1,500 
1973 27,144 40,917 1,507 
1974 18,440 43,012 2,333 
1975 24,099 58,776 2,439 
1976 29,626 68,481 2,312 
1977 14,058 30,295 2,155 
1978 14,741 34,076 2,312 
1979 18,280 42,683 2,335 
1980 20,246 50,625 2,501 
1981 25,183 69,370 2,755 
1982 29,123 106,202 3,647 
1983 35,031 122,103 3,486 
1984 43,620 113,625 2,605 
1985 44,213 117,838 2,665 
1986 40,767 127,315 3,123 
1987 32,810 87,802 2,676 
1988 25,546 63,048 2,468 
1989 25,528 63,450 2,486 
1990 36,746 79,316 2,159 
Source:  Adapted from Military Backaround Compensation 
Papers. 1991. D. 394. 
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$9.3 million in training costs in 1980. (5th QRMC, 1983, p. 
412) 
Reenlistment bonuses, like their counterpart for 
enlistments, were initiated with an institutional 
philosophy.  The first reenlistment bonuses were paid as 
"reenlistment bounties" in 1795 to all members reenlisting 
in the armed forces.  The universal eligibility of all 
military personnel to receive a reenlistment bonus continued 
until 1974.  The modern program is traced to the Career 
Compensation Act of 1949, which was based upon studies of 
the Hook Commission.  The Hook Commission recommended, on 
the basis of its 1948 study, that:  1) bonuses be based upon 
the number of years for which a member reenlists; 2) bonuses 
should increase for longer reenlistments; 3) the member's 
reenlistment should occur to ensure continuous service; and 
4) the number of bonuses a member can be paid should be 
limited. (MCBP, 1991, p. 398) 
The Act of July 6, 1954 modified the provisions of the 
1949 legislation by placing more emphasis (and monetary 
reward) on first reenlistments rather than subsequent career 
reenlistments.  This set in place the provisions of the 
Regular Reenlistment Bonus (RRB) that survived until 1974. 
The program had a strong institutional base, as every member 
accepted for reenlistment was paid the bonus.  The RRB was 
augmented in 1965 with a new, market-oriented program, the 
Variable Reenlistment Bonus (VRB).  The VRB was designed to 
target individuals filling critical skill areas, and only 
first-term reenlistees were eligible.  The variable bonus 
could be paid in addition to the regular bonus.  These bonus 
programs were in place when the draft ended in 1973. 
Both the RRB and VRB were terminated with Public Law 
93-277 (Armed Forces Personnel Revision Act of 1974), which 
enacted the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB).  The SRB 
changed the focus of the bonus program by specifically 
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targeting "critical" areas for bonus eligibility.  Such 
modification was necessary because it has been estimated 
that the previously employed RRB excessively paid $43 
million, in 1972 and 1973, to individuals who would have 
reenlisted anyway or were in fields with ample manpower to 
fill their required billets. (MCBP, 1991, p. 399)  This 
conflicted directly with the goal of economists to obtain 
the best force for the lowest possible cost.2 
Over the years, Congress has enacted legislation to 
refine and improve the SRB by changing maximum bonus limits, 
administrative procedures, and eligibility requirements.  By 
1993, the program had a maximum payment ceiling of $45,000 
and consisted of three eligibility zones reflecting 
time-in-service requirements for service members.  If a 
service member's field is identified as critical, he or she 
can receive one bonus in each of the three zones.  Each zone 
and field has an identified multiplier that is the basis for 
the size of the bonus.  In this manner, bonuses are only 
paid to fill critical or difficult-to-fill billets. 
Current payment procedures for the SRB combine 
institutionalist and market considerations by paying service 
members both current and future money.  Fifty percent of the 
bonus is paid upon reenlistment, with the balance paid in 
equal installments over the life of the reenlistment period. 
Although Congress has at times authorized initial payments 
in excess of 50 percent, budget considerations have 
prevented the Services from providing larger initial 
payments as bonus incentives. 
2This is a symbolic expression that does not portray 
true "economic thought."  Better economic representations 
would be to maximize defense utility while minimizing cost 
or obtaining maximum utility for the last dollar spent on 
defense. 
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Table 3-3 presents cost data for military personnel 
receiving the SRB from 1975-1990.  Several points of 
interest in the table deserve consideration.  First, the 
period 1977-1980 has previously been identified as a problem 
for pay lags against the CPI, GI Bill termination, and 
enlistment bonuses.  Again, with reenlistment bonuses, there 
was no increased usage to offset force-level problems.  It 
is readily apparent how the term "hollow force" developed 
during this time period.  Second, throughout the 1980s, the 
SRB was used extensively to target and retain required 
service members.  This is particularly obvious in 1981 and 
1982.  Table 2-4 demonstrated the decline in reenlistment 
rates for career personnel throughout the 1970s.  The SRB 
was used extensively, in combination with basic pay 
increases, to stop the mass exodus of career service 
members.  Finally, the average bonus per reenlistee offered 
in the late 1980s was not significantly different from that 
offered in the late 1970s, yet the retention results and 
force capabilities were significantly different during those 
periods. 
The differences in retention and recruiting efforts 
during the periods highlight the overall value of the 
complete compensation program.  Economists espouse combining 
a variety of programs to achieve a targeted goal of 
maximizing defense while minimizing cost.  During the late 
1970s, it appears that the focus shifted primarily to cost 
and many defense requirements were neglected. 
The 5th QRMC studied the SRB in great detail and 
determined that it was a reasonably good method of force 
management.  However, the Commission studied each zone for 
elasticity of reenlistments with respect to bonus payments. 
While acknowledging the complexity of the analyses, it 
arrived at different conclusions for each zone.  The 
Commission determined "Zone A bonuses appear effective in 
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Table 3-3 
SRB Costs and Number of Personnel, 1975-1990 
Total Total Cost Cost per 
Fiscal Year Personnel ($000) Reenlistment 
1975 47,804 126,213 2,640 
1976 49,035 63,939 1,304 
1977 78,729 103,783 1,318 
1978 116,955 149,813 1,281 
1979 145,248 242,356 1,669 
1980 115,843 296,300 2,558 
1981 130,768 598,631 4,578 
1982 93,895 490,932 5,229 
1983 130,168 354,966 2,727 
1984 186,131 406,574 2,184 
1985 238,012 486,911 2,046 
1986 268,005 554,541 2,069 
1987 285,832 508,614 1,779 
1988 272,277 468,336 1,720 
1989 266,215 498,451 1,872 
1990 260,518 484,303 "1,859 
Source:  Adapted from Military Compensation Background 
Papers. 1991, D. 405. 
inducing additional reenlistments"; "Zone B bonuses appear 
less effective than those in Zone A" but are still 
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effective; and the "possibility...[exists that]...Zone C 
changes in the bonus are currently not an effective means to 
induce changes in reenlistment." (5th QRMC, 1983, p. 655)  A 
separate study by Hosek, Fernandez, and Gissmer in 1984 
determined that the relationship between pay decreases and 
bonus increases required to maintain retention rates were 
pertinent and within acceptable levels.  Their analysis 
found that an "aggressive use of the existing SRB could 
blunt the effects of declining pay and unemployment on 
retention in critical skills." (Hosek et al., 1984, p. 29) 
To this point, the discussion of market applications 
has centered on bonus payments.  However, there is another 
aspect of this approach that has had a major impact on the 
military compensation system.  The 7th QRMC identified three 
basic components of a "flexible, efficient military- 
compensation system." They were basic pay, allowances, and 
S&I pays. (7th QRMC, 1992, p. 95)  The institutional nature 
of basic pay and allowances has been previously discussed in 
this chapter.  Special and incentive pays are the only part 
of the Commission's "big three" that is based upon the 
market philosophy.  The earliest S&I pay, career sea pay, 
was initiated in 1835, and various S&I pays have been 
incorporated since (see Appendix B).  The original intent of 
the pays was to compensate individuals for exposure to 
excessively hazardous conditions.  Nevertheless, over the 
years, S&I pays have evolved to represent a modern, economic 
function.  That is, 
...today most special and incentive pays are 
focused more on providing additional incentives to 
members of the armed forces to enter into certain 
career fields that would, without those 
incentives, experience manning shortfalls (MCBP 
1991, p. 147). 
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Regular military compensation serves as the basis of 
comparability between military and civilian wages.  Special 
and incentive pays are used to augment RMC and to ensure 
that military wages remain competitive with civilian wages 
in critical fields where the average civilian wage is 
considerably above RMC levels.  This procedure is used in 
place of individual wage scales for separate military 
occupations.  Table 3-4 shows the impact of S&I pays on the 
entire force.  While S&I pays account for about 5 percent of 
the total DoD cash compensation, 43 percent of all military 
personnel receive one or more S&I pays. 
Table 3-4 
S&I Pay Data by Service, 1992 
Category DoB USA USN USMC USAF USCG 
S&I pays  as a percentage 
of   total  cash 
compensation 
5 3 8 3 4 3 
Percentage of the  force 
drawing S&I pays -/WM 33 71 29 33 40 
Source:  From 7th QRMC, Major Topical Summary (MTS)-4, 1992, 
pp. 4-5. 
A major concern has always been to maintain proper 
balance between various incentive pays.  Regular and 
consistent analysis of incentive pays, short-term bonuses, 
manpower requirements, and labor market conditions are 
required to ensure that proper balance is maintained. 
Unfortunately, the previously described difficulties of 
maintaining RMC are equally applicable to S&I pays.  The 7th 
QRMC found that there is an "absence of a consistent and 
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effective method for reviewing and adjusting incentive 
pays." (7th QRMC (MTS-4), 1992, p. 4-3)  Table 3-5 contains 
data on the cumulative changes in the five largest incentive 
pays (based upon number of recipients).  The table uses 1974 
as the base year and demonstrates a consistent lack of 
attention to these five pays, as compared with the regular 
adjustments provided to elements of RMC.  As previously 
noted, the average adjustment to S&I pays occurred after 6 
to 10 years, with proportional adjustments of 10 to 180 
percent.  Proper attention and balance must be maintained to 
ensure force maintenance. 
The market approach allows for the specific targeting 
of the military's personnel needs and the development of 
compensation systems to address those needs.  For example, 
if reenlistment efforts are proceeding without difficulty, 
then the SRB can be reduced or eliminated.  If initial 
enlistments are a problem, then specific bonuses or 
incentives can be implemented to attract the required 
personnel to fill the Services' needs. 
The evidence is clear--the military can be staffed at 
lower cost by targeting compensation incentives specifically 
where they are needed and to individuals who place value on 
the incentives.  The equal spreading of compensation 
incentives to all service members is inefficient and wasted 
on those members who do not value the entitlement.  The 
"cafeteria" style of benefits and services can be both 
flexible and efficient.  The cafeteria style grew out of the 
recognition that individuals have different needs and do not 
place equal value on equal entitlements.  Market proponents 
recognize this fact and argue against the paternalistic 
practice of providing universal benefits and services for 
all members.  Indeed, one company that implemented a 
cafeteria style plan reported that only 10 percent of its 
employees selected the same benefits offered under the 
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Table 3-5 
Cumulative Percentage Change in Incentive Pays Since 1974, 
by Fiscal Year, 1974-1991 
Basic Career 
FY Pay BAQ BAS Sea Pay 
1974 100 100 100 100 
















1976    109    116    110 
1977    116    129    118 
1978    122    136    124 
1979    130    146    133 
1980    130    146    146 125 110 100 
1981    146    163    163 
1982    167    186    187 162 154 
1983    173    193    194 
1984    173    193    194 
1985    180    201    202 183 
1986    187    209    210 
1987    193    215    216 
1988    199    222    223 150 
1989    203    226    227 
1990    211    242    237 190 130 
1991    219    251    245 
Notes:   l)   "X"   denotes  increases  tor certain grades,-;   and    7)   1974  or 
Starting Year =  100 
Source:     From 7th QRMC   (MTS-4),   1992,   p.   4-4. 
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firm's old program (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991, p. 403).  The 
Services could gain several benefits from efficient 
application of incentives, including: 1) cost containment; 
2) provision of benefits desired and valued most by 
employees; and 3) the opportunity for employees to express 
their value on available benefits. (Henderson, 1989, pp. 
452-453)  Providing benefits valued by service members will 
enhance the military compensation package. 
The market approach places high value on current cash 
compensation initiatives.  If the institutional approaches 
of subsidized and deferred benefits and separate housing and 
food allowances were abandoned in favor of a combined 
payment, i.e., through a salary system, the system would 
become much simpler and easier to manage.  Of course, new 
methods of adjustment would be required to evaluate such a 
system.  This market force does affect the military 
compensation system, but it conflicts with the consequences 
of an internal labor market. 
The military's internal labor market encourages 
service members to remain on active duty through the ability 
to compete for promotional positions.  The fact that the 
personnel system is closed and all hiring is done from 
within the force leads to career aspirations for large 
numbers of service personnel.  Service members entering the 
armed forces with career desires are more concerned with the 
present value of their career earnings, as opposed to the 
initial wages paid. (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991, pp. 420-421) 
Another advantage of the internal labor market is the 
ability to keep hiring costs low.  Because the military only 
hires at the entry level (E-l or 0-1), it is able to keep 
its entry wages relatively low.  Low entry wages come with 
the understanding that if the individual is selected for 
promotion, his or her potential for career earnings is 
comparable with competing sources of employment. 
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An internal labor market can save additional hiring 
costs because it allows the armed forces to observe workers 
on the job and select the best performers.  By permitting 
on-the-job evaluations, the military can make better 
personnel decisions.  (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991, p. 168) 
This aspect of labor economics is congruent with the 
institutional desire to build a professional, highly-capable 
career force. 
A major advantage of the market approach becomes a 
disadvantage when considered in the context of an internal 
labor market.  That is, the market approach relies on supply 
and demand to establish wage rates in the labor market. 
However, an internal labor market removes the competitive 
nature of the market from those forces acting on labor 
supply and demand.  Since the military only hires (promotes) 
career personnel from within its ranks, the competition from 
outside sources is essentially removed.  While it remains 
necessary to take account of the opportunity cost of 
military personnel, to achieve the desired shape for the 
force the true cost savings that the market approach 
theorizes may not be attainable in an internal market. 
Additionally, the market system is extremely complex. 
For example, maintenance of S&I pays and bonuses for 
enlistment and reenlistment in critical fields makes a 
market-driven compensation program difficult to manage.  In 
addition, developing and maintaining individual pay charts 
for military occupations reinforces the complexity of the 
system. 
A market system does not consider the basic 
organizational requirements of shared responsibility for the 
defense of the nation.  Instead, it concentrates solely on 
each individual's job skills.  There is a certain amount of 
shared responsibility and hardship prevalent throughout the 
armed forces that builds comraderie and esprit.  A 
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market-driven system of separate pay scales for members of 
the same grade in different job specialties could adversely 
affect the armed forces by creating morale problems through 
appearances of inequity. 
During a major, prolonged conflict on the scale of 
World War I or II, the market approach could also be very 
expensive.  As Henderson has observed, "voluntarism depends 
to some extent on patriotism.  If people are not patriotic, 
then they must be paid more to join than if they were 
patriotic." (Henderson, 1988, p. 29)  A war's popularity and 
its impact on national patriotism could adversely affect 
recruiting efforts.  Relying on the labor market's supply 
and demand to meet manpower requirements could become very 
expensive during periods of  unpopular military activities. 
Demand would obviously rise while supply would at the least 
remain the same, if not decrease.  In either scenario, the 
costs of recruiting new enlistees could be expected to rise 
substantially.  This would be particularly distressing to 
organizations, such as the military, that only hire at the 
entry level. Of course, any prolonged conflict on the scale 
of a world war would likely lead to the reinstitution of 
military conscription. 
Just as bonuses are flexible, S&I pays are inflexible. 
The rates are set by Congress and are not open to Service 
discretion, as are bonuses.  The constant need for 
monitoring and maintenance, coupled with the lack of the 
same, have made these pays an important, yet neglected, tool 
for force-level maintenance. 
C.  COMPARISON OF INSTITUTIONAL AND MARKET APPROACHES 
Table 3-6 summarizes the basic philosophical 
differences between the institutional and market approaches 
to military compensation. 
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Table 3-6 







Philosophy Equal pay for equal 
responsibility 
Equal pay for equal 
work 




Obtain best force at 
the lowest possible 
cost 
Framework Intangibles such as, 
cohesion, honor 
commitment 
Supply and demand 
Pay Paternalistic; 
deferred income and 
in-kind payments 
Individualistic ; 
current income and 
personal preference 
Allowances Based upon service 
member's needs 




Member's role is to 
defend the nation 




Uniformly applied to 
all service members 
Applied only to 
critical occupations 
D.  LESSONS LEARNED 
1.  Compensation System is Equitable 
The nation has blended diverging philosophies to form 
an equitable compensation system for the armed forces.  A 
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single basic pay scale, with universal pay adjustments, has 
contributed to a sense of equality and esprit among military 
members.  Similarly, despite periodic protests of inequity, 
the multiple allowance rates based upon need are also 
equitable.  This conclusion is underscored by the continuing 
success of the AVF.  If the system were grossly unfair and 
inadequate, military personnel would undoubtedly 
"express their dissatisfaction by 'voting with their feet' 
and leaving the service." (Grosz, 1983, p. 11) 
2. Bonuses are Efficient and Flexible 
Enlistment and selective reenlistment bonuses are 
efficient methods to fill critical billets.  By applying a 
purely market approach to the military compensation system, 
the armed forces have been able to target, attract, and 
retain personnel to meet their qualitative and quantitative 
needs in critical areas. 
3. S&I Pays are Vital for Force Management 
Special and incentive pays are vital components of 
force compensation management.  S&I pays enable the nation 
to provide an acceptable compensation level to obtain the 
majority of the required force and target extra compensation 
to essential personnel.  The fact is, 43 percent of military 
personnel receive at least one type of S&I pay.  If the 
armed forces could provide only basic pay to attract the 
military force, the pay would have to be set high enough to 
attract the 43 percent that are paid special pays.  Setting 
the base pay that high would result in overpaying the 
remaining 57 percent of the force that would have enlisted 
at the lower rates.  The S&I mechanism provides a lower 
overall manpower cost by targeting specific occupations for 
retention. 
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4. S&X Pays Should be Updated Regularly 
The importance of S&I pays requires that they be 
evaluated and adjusted on a regular basis.  The majority of 
military personnel are under contracts and active duty 
service obligations; therefore, problems may not be seen 
immediately.  The discontent in critical specialties created 
by allowing S&I pays to lag could create long-term problems 
for short-term gains.  To maintain force readiness, the 
military needs to maintain a proper mix of military 
manpower.  Every S&I pay used to maintain the armed forces 
must be evaluated and updated regularly.     The fact that 
incentive pays have been allowed to stagnate an average of 6 
to 10 years, and then be adjusted up to 180 percent, is 
unacceptable. 
5. Institutional and Market Practices are Vital 
A purely institutional or a purely market approach 
would not provide a satisfactory system of military 
compensation.  Each approach has strengths and weaknesses, 
as discussed in this chapter.  The current system of 
military compensation is not perfect, but it has 
successfully blended the major advantages of each approach 
into one comprehensive package. 
6. The Internal Labor Market is Consistent with 
Institutional Strategies 
The closed manpower system of the military services is 
congruent with an internal labor market.  The internal labor 
market has several key features that are consistent with 
institutional philosophies.  For example, it encourages 
career considerations; it emphasizes the present value of 
career earnings over initial wage rates; and it requires the 
payment of wages comparable with competing employment 
sources over the member's career. 
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IV.  STANDARDIZED APPROACH TO MILITARY 
COMPENSATION 
The compensation system of the AVF is not guided by a 
formal set of principles or guidelines (7th QRMC, 1992, p. 
151).  Numerous studies over the years have recommended the 
enactment or adoption of standard principles to guide 
military compensation decisions; however, despite these 
efforts, legislative adjustments often vary with respect to 
their method and intent.  This fact was illustrated when 
President Ronald Reagan stated, in his activation letter of 
the 5th QRMC (1982), that "a coherent and logical statement 
of principles and concepts of military compensation in 
relation to national security objectives should be 
required...." (5th QRMC, 1984, p. A-l)  As discussed in 
earlier chapters, there are numerous legislative 
requirements that provide limited guidelines for military 
compensation.  However, no formal philosophy or set of 
principles has been established.  Automatic pay adjustments 
may be the closest that military compensation has come to a 
formal guide. 
Earlier in Chapter II, a detailed discussion was 
provided on the development of procedures for automatic pay 
adjustments.  The automatic pay adjustments are closely 
linked to the principle of pay comparability.  Pay 
comparability with the civilian sector is recognized as a 
major goal of military supporters and numerous legislators. 
However, there are competing principles, such as pay 
competitiveness, that deserve equal consideration.  Although 
automatic pay adjustment procedures have been instituted, 
there has been some concern over the effects of pay 
comparability on the institutional nature of the armed 
forces.  The issue of compensation principles has been 
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analyzed by numerous groups and agencies, such as the QRMC, 
GAO, Defense Manpower Commission (DMC), and DoD. Each has 
presented ideas on the development of standardized 
principles to guide military compensation. 
In 1986, GAO identified the following potential 
benefits of compensation principles: 1) they define a policy 
for military compensation; 2) they provide a framework to 
evaluate and change the compensation system; 3) they provide 
a reference point to judge the consistency of compensation 
adjustments; 4) they bring stability to the compensation 
system; and 5) they help service members understand the 
rationale for periodic changes.  (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, p. 
21)  Development of pay standards, regardless of their 
methodology, would ensure review in a standard, established 
method.  The compensation system would not be subject to 
sporadic, irregular review and revision.  As Air Force 
Lieutenant General Benjamin 0. Davis, Jr. has stated, 
"without an agreed-upon standard, there can be no 
consistency in the necessary periodic reviews of the 
adequacy of military pay and benefits." (Report of the 
President's Commission on Military Compensation. 1978, p. 
185) 
This chapter concentrates on the principles of 
comparability and competitiveness as examined by various 
studies, commissions, and agencies. 
A.  COMPENSATION CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 
The idea of having guidelines or a codified set of 
principles for military compensation has been studied 
extensively.  The general consensus is that such standards 
would help to regulate changes as well as to evaluate 
consistency, cost-effectiveness, and the logic of 
compensation proposals. (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, pp. 20-21) 
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The 5th QRMC believed that "any... compensation system, 
should be based on certain underlying principles which... 
comprise its philosophy." (5th QRMC, 1984, p. II-l)  The 
absence of a written set of standards, despite the belief 
they would be beneficial to the management of the 
compensation system, indicates disagreement over either the 
philosophy of compensation or the principles themselves.  A 
review of compensation studies reveals basic agreement over 
fundamental principles or philosophies.  Despite differences 
in terminology, many agencies such as the 5th and 7th QRMCs, 
DoD, and GAO, have supported the establishment of policy 
guidelines to provide an acceptable standard of living, 
offer flexibility, be acceptable to military personnel, 
support the military structure, offer pay visibility to the 
military and public, reward superior performance, and 
compensate for the X-factor. (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, p. 25) 
Additionally, independent studies, such as the 1978 Report 
of the President's Commission on Military Compensation, 
recognized the value of several of these principles (p. 11). 
The result would be a conceptual foundation for compensation 
that is both flexible and manageable, and additionally 
motivates members of the military. 
Given the basic agreement on principles, the underlying 
philosophy of compensation should be examined.  The main 
disagreement is a reflection of the different approaches to 
compensation, that is, institutional or market.  Each 
approach espouses a method of achieving compensation equity. 
Generally, institutionalists support the concept of job 
comparability, while advocates of the market approach 
support the competitiveness principle.  Although both 
approaches have the same goal of attracting and retaining 
the required military force, their support of different 
principles reflects the divergence of their compensation 
philosophies. (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, p. 26)  Although 
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comparability and competitiveness have evolved into 
competing principles, some authors, such as Charles Moskos, 
maintain that the pay competitiveness model is actually an 
outgrowth of the pay comparability model. 
1.  Pay Comparability Principle 
In 1982, Robert Komer and Robert B. Pirie, Jr. wrote 
the following dissent of a position paper prepared by the 
Atlantic Council's Working Group on Military Service: 
If pay comparability is maintained, and human 
resources are managed effectively, there is no 
reason why the nation's military manpower 
requirements cannot continue being met with 
volunteers. (Komer and Pirie, 1982, p. 308) 
Many authorities in defense manpower would likewise 
agree that pay comparability is important to the success of 
the AVF.  Pay comparability is defined as "setting and 
adjusting pay levels in one organization on the basis of 
wage surveys showing the compensation paid by other 
organizations." (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, p. 26)  The 5th QRMC 
definition of pay comparability includes "equal pay for 
substantially  equal work." (5th QRMC, 1984, p. II-3)  This 
implies that the conditions of employment between 
organizations may be different, but there are facets of the 
jobs that are relatively comparable.  Many problems under 
this philosophy have been created because analysts attempted 
to determine" equal pay for equal work.  The unique aspects 
and requirements of military life separate military service 
members from their civilian counterparts.  Therefore, exact 
comparisons between the military and civilian sectors cannot 
be made.  The 5th QRMC recognized this and argued for 
comparison of substantially equal work.  With this 
consideration, there are several factors that can be used to 
compare military and private sector occupations for 
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potential pay comparisons.  These factors are: 1) work 
performed; 2) knowledge, skills, and abilities; 3) job 
responsibilities; 4) age; and 5) education. 
(GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, pp. 26-27) 
These factors are vital measures to ensure that the 
internal labor market provides compensation comparable with 
competing employers.  Employees working in an internal labor 
market place relatively high value on their career earnings. 
Pay comparability provides the mechanism to assure military 
compensation remains competitive throughout the service 
member's career.  The wages established through pay 
comparability with the civilian sector become internalized 
and accepted in the military community. (Ehrenberg and 
Smith, 1991, p. 421) 
There are several advantages gained by using pay 
comparability as a method for establishing compensation 
levels.  Initially, comparing military wages with those 
earned in the private sector gives service members a feeling 
of equity.  They believe they are being paid fairly at 
levels comparable to those they could earn outside the 
military.  Similarly, pay comparability provides a logical 
method of wage analysis that military personnel and policy 
officials can understand and rely upon.  Military members 
know what level of compensation they will receive for their 
efforts.  The armed forces gain stability of pay for their 
manpower that is safe from frequent labor market 
adjustments.  Finally, pay comparability proponents 
recognize the primary function of military service as armed 
combat.  Therefore, they have supported the notion that 
basic pay rates should be the same for each grade and 
longevity step. (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, p. 27) 
The results of pay comparability efforts are difficult 
to quantify because of the different wage rates paid for 
different occupations across the nation.  Additionally, GAO 
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has reported that almost 2 0 percent of military jobs are 
combat-related with no civilian equivalent.  However, an 
admittedly unscientific study of wage comparability reported 
by the Navy Times in 1993 revealed fairly consistent results 
with other studies.  That is, service members with technical 
skills are underpaid, while those with general skills are 
better paid than their civilian counterparts. (Philpott, 
August 16, 1993, p. 12)  This a consistent criticism of the 
institutional approach to compensation and highlights a 
major disadvantage of underpaying some members while 
overpaying others. 
Opponents of pay comparability believe it is virtually 
impossible to achieve comparability because of the 
significant differences between military and civilian 
working conditions.  Coupled with special manpower 
considerations required to staff the armed forces, pay 
comparability is difficult to fully implement.  Finally, pay 
comparability may not even be required in an AVF, since 
service members do "volunteer" for more than pay alone. 
(GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, p. 28)  These criticisms are voiced 
by market supporters who prefer the competitive model. 
The market supporters are not alone as opponents of pay 
comparability.  Some proponents of institutional principles, 
oppose comparability as well.  Their basic argument centers 
on continuance of the paternalistic elements of military- 
compensation found in benefits, subsidized shopping, 
recreation, deferred income, and the like.  Throughout the 
history of the armed forces and the AVF, the compensation 
system has been designed to take care of the member and his 
or her family.  Highly paternalistic, the system has not 
openly identified service members as "employees" per se. 
One opponent, Captain John Greenbacker (USN), feels the 
shift toward pay comparability is a move toward treating 
service members as employees, that is, by rewarding 
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performance on the basis of work alone.  Why retain any 
paternalistic features of the military compensation system, 
Greenbacker asks?  If, in fact, service members are paid 
wages that are truly "comparable" to their civilian 
counterparts, why should there be any differences in 
compensation systems? (Greenbacker, 1978, p. 35) 
2.  Pay Competitiveness Principle 
The pay competitiveness principle is based upon the 
market philosophy of compensation.  This principle is rooted 
in labor supply and demand and states that military 
personnel be compensated at levels necessary for recruiting 
and retention programs.  Pay competitiveness implies that 
the Services pay no more or no less than what is required to 
staff the nation's forces.  The competitive nature of this 
system suggests that pay differentials be established based 
upon skill, education, and jobs tasks, and that pay be 
highly visible.  Pay visibility requires that compensation 
be provided in competitive wages, as opposed to enticements, 
to ensure competitive comparability. (Moskos, 1978, p. 35) 
The major advantage offered by the pay competitiveness 
principle is cost-effectiveness.  The market approach 
achieves the desired force size and structure at the least 
cost.  As stated in Chapter III, the market approach 
specifically targets job specialties required for the armed 
forces.  Pay competitiveness is the method used here to 
determine the exact wages that employees should be paid. 
With this method, there is no underpayment or overpayment of 
personnel.  There are no non-monetary benefits provided that 
the service member may or may not value.  There is no excess 
compensation. 
Conversely, the pay competitiveness model has several 
disadvantages.  Critics believe that pay competitiveness 
would destabilize the military pay system by subjecting it 
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to labor market fluctuations.  Existing shortages in the 
labor market, they find, would adversely affect the armed 
forces in their recruiting efforts through increased costs. 
Similarly, the system would increase costs required to 
maintain different pay tables for different occupations. 
The main arguments, however, center on the institutional 
nature of the armed forces, as discussed in Chapter III.  As 
the embodiment of the market philosophy of compensation, pay 
competitiveness is said to entail all of the following 
drawbacks: 1) it undermines the hierarchical structure of 
the armed forces; 2) it dismantles many of the paternalistic 
features of military service; 3) it undermines the morale 
and motivation of service members by establishing disparate 
pay for equal commitment to defense of the nation; 4) it 
ignores the unique factors of military service (GAO/NSIAD- 
86-11, 1986, pp. 31-32); and 5) it leads service members to 
more closely relate to their civilian counterparts than to 
the members of the armed forces. (Moskos, 1978, p. 35) 
B.  LESSONS LEARNED 
1.  No Set of Principles Exist 
There is no formal set of compensation standards or 
principles for the AVF.  Several studies, such as the 
Quadrennial Reviews of Military Compensation, have included 
statements of principles that should guide military 
compensation.  However, reviews of these various materials 
show that the guidelines for military compensation have 
changed with each commission.  Although the majority of 
studies on this topic find that development of compensation 
standards would benefit the nation, the military 
compensation system has operated throughout the AVF without 
them. (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, p. 35) 
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2.  The Compensation System is Complex but Adequate 
The military compensation system today contains 
elements of both pay comparability and competitiveness.  The 
system is based primarily upon pay comparability.  However, 
the system's S&I pays are a direct outgrowth of the pay 
competitiveness model.  Despite the complexity of mixing 
these two philosophies in one system, the President's 
Commission on Military Compensation (1978) concluded that 
neither approach was preferable to the other and that the 
current system had done an adequate job determining 
appropriate pay ranges. (Report of the President's 
Commission on Military Compensation, 1978, p. 117)  More 
recently, the 7th QRMC determined "(t)he existing pay and 
allowances structure has evolved and endured because it has 
helped build and maintain a robust military force." (7th 
QRMC, 1992, p. 3)  The current system is a complex blend of 
competing principles, yet it has worked to provide a 
balanced and competent military force. 
3.  Development of Compensation Principles Would be 
Beneficial 
There is basic agreement concerning the primary goals 
of the military pay system, and there is also little 
question that the current compensation system can support 
the future force structure. (7th QRMC, 1992, p. 4)  However, 
the compensation system could be improved through the 
development of guiding principles.  The potential benefits 
of having such principles include: 1) generating confidence 
in the armed forces and the public that compensation is set 
in a rational, logical manner; 2) providing military 
personnel with a benchmark upon which to evaluate their 
compensation; and 3) resolving the continuing controversy 
over whether military personnel are fairly and appropriately 
paid.  (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 1986, p. 35) 
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4.  Pay Comparability is Required for Competitive 
Military Compensation 
Pay comparability is needed for a competitive 
compensation program that can effectively recruit and retain 
the required number and type of military personnel.  Equity 
and competitive career earnings for service members are also 
achieved through pay comparability.  These advantages are 
congruent with the institutional philosophy and the 
military's internal labor market.  The advantages provided 
by pay comparability significantly outweigh its 
disadvantages. 
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V.  POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS 
Virtually every issue discussed in this chapter has 
been previously introduced in the study.  However, these 
issues remain as potential problems for the military 
compensation system. 
A.  ISSUES 
1.  The Dependency Factor3 
Since 1918, the military compensation system has 
consistently provided additional compensation to service 
members who have dependents.  Basic allowance for quarters 
may be the best known entitlement that is provided at 
different rates based solely upon marital status.  However, 
it is not the only payment of this type.  For example, the 
family separation allowance (FSA) is only paid to married 
service members who are restricted from residing with their 
dependents.  In 1963, the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
felt that this restriction "result[ed] in an inequity as 
compared to those members whose dependents [were] authorized 
to accompany them." (MCBP, 1991, p. 685)  The resultant FSA 
payments totalled $1.3 billion in 1990 alone.  The enactment 
of FSA payments created another inequity between married and 
single members of the military.  Single service members have 
no entitlement, despite working in the same restricted 
environment as their married counterparts. 
Inequities also exist in benefits provided to married 
members for their dependents.  Dependents are authorized 
access to the majority of subsidized, military facilities, 
such as commissaries, exchanges, movie theaters, and 
3This term is taken from Martin Binkin, The Military 
Pay Muddle, 1975. 
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recreational centers.  Health care for dependents, the 
Survivor Benefit Plan, and the Dependency and Indemnity 
Compensation program all provide substantial benefits to the 
married member for which the single member receives no 
compensation and is ineligible to participate. 
Despite these differences, the single most visible 
inequity between married and single personnel is in BAQ 
rates.  Each month, the single member receives a pay 
statement and is reminded of the disparity between his or 
her lodging allowance and the allowance given to married 
members performing the same job, at the same duty station. 
Table 5-1 contains the 1990 BAQ rates, annotated to show the 
additional allowance given to married members solely because 
of their dependents.  The percentage difference, or added 
compensation, was determined by dividing the payment 
difference (column 4) by the "without dependents rate" 
(column 2).  The results in column 5 indicate that married 
members are compensated from 15 to 79 percent more than 
their single counterparts.  As the armed forces continue to 
rely on labor market mechanisms for recruitment, 
paternalistic practices, such as the BAQ differences, could 
present problems. 
2.  Variable Food Allowance Rates 
The DoD Pay Manual currently identifies four different 
types of BAS: one for officers and three for enlisted 
personnel.  The three enlisted categories entail different 
degrees of availability of government mess facilities: 1) 
mess is available, but members are authorized to subsist 
separately; 2) rations-in-kind are not available; and 3) no 
government mess facilities are available.  Table 5-2 
contains the 1991 rates for BAS compared with the 
government's daily cost to feed service personnel.  Since 
none of the rates are tied to actual food costs, the 
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Table 5-1 
Comparison of BAQ Rates for Military Personnel, With and 

































661.50 813.90 152.40 23.0 
606.90 733.20 126.30 20.8 
584.40 706.50 122.10 20.9 
541.50 623.10 81.60 15.1 
434.10 515.70 81.60 18.8 
344.40 440.10 95.70 27.8 
289.80 393.30 103.50 35.7 
488.70 551.10 62.40 12.8 
410.70 505.20 94.50 23.0 
364.50 464.70 100.20 27.5 
305.40 402.00 96.60 31.6 
401.40 528.90 127.50 31.8 
368.70 487.50 118.80 32.2 
314.70 453.00 138.30 44.0 
284.70 418.50 133.80 47.0 
262.50 376.20 113.70 43.3 
228.60 327.30 98.70 43.2 
224.40 304.50 80.10 35.7 
182.40 289.80 107.40 58.9 
162.00 289.80 127.80 78.9 
d from Military Compensation Backcrround 
Papers, 1991, pp. 91-101 
disparity between the BAS rates creates actual wage 
differences between military service members.  Table 5-2 
indicates that, in 1991, enlisted personnel were 
overcompensated based upon actual food costs.  A calculation 
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of 1.0 would indicate that personnel were provided BAS equal 
to the government's daily cost-to-feed a service member. 
Using this scale, the BAS payment differences, for the three 
classes of BAS, ranged from 16 (1.16) to 88 (1.88) percent 
for identical food requirements.  All officers were 
under-compensated by 12 percent for similar food 
requirements.  Although the differences between officer and 
enlisted rates are substantial, a major concern centers on 
the continuing discrepancies between enlisted rates. 
3.  Tax Advantage of Non-Taxable Allowances 
Martin Binkin has argued that much of the problem 
surrounding the military compensation system stems from its 
complexity and the inability to accurately appraise the true 
value of in-kind benefits. (Binkin, 1975, p.18) Complicating 
appraisal efforts is the non-taxable status of housing (BAQ) 
and food (BAS) allowances and in-kind benefits.  The 
tax-free provision of BAQ and BAS allowances is traced to a 
1925 Court of Claims decision.  The Court ruled that neither 
the provision of housing nor food nor monetary allowances 
provided in lieu of housing or food are subject to federal 
income taxation. (MCBP, 1991, p. 115) 
Commonly referred to as "tax advantage," allowances 
have become a controversial component of military 
compensation.  Prior to the 1940s, tax advantage was not a 
significant consideration because of the small amounts paid 
to service members in BAQ and BAS.  However, throughout the 
history of the AVF, the monetary amounts paid have grown 
significantly along with the tax advantage.  In 1975, Binkin 
estimated that the annual tax savings by military personnel 
ranged from $387 for a new recruit to $3,300 for a general 
officer. (Binkin, 1975, p. 21)  By 1991, DoD estimated the 
advantage had grown to $691 and $5,057, for an E-l and a 
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Table 5-2 
Comparison of 1991 BAS Rates and Daily-Cost-to-Feed 
Estimates, by Availability of Mess Facility and Grade 
Category 




































8.50 1.73 9.20 1.88 4.30 0.88 
Source:  1991 Daily Cost-to-Feed Rate from the 7th QRMC, 
1992, p. 62. 1991 BAS rates from the DoD Pay Manual. 
general officer, respectively.  Table 5-3 contains the data 
from DoD with potential low, high, and average ranges. 
Calculations of tax advantage can only be estimated 
because each individual gains a tax advantage based upon his 
or her unique financial situation.  Individual tax advantage 
depends on: 1) the amount of basic pay received, based upon 
grade and time-in-service; 2) the value of BAQ and BAS 
received; 3) the number of personal exemptions; and 4) the 
member's marital status. (MCBP, 1991, p. 123)  Because of 
its complexity "the number of military personnel, defense 
officials, and legislators who understand the concept of tax 
advantage...is probably very small." (Binkin, 1975, p.21) 
An additional tax advantage can be received by service 
members whose legal state of residence has no income tax or 
does not tax military income.  Appendix C contains an 
explanation of states that have no income tax or provide 
differential income tax treatment for military personnel. 
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Table 5-3 
Estimates of Tax Advantage for Military Personnel, by Pay 
Grade, 1991 
Low Range of  High Range of Average Tax 
Pav Grade   Tax Advanta9e Tax Advantage Advantage 
—Y.      /^-n,„„\      (dollars) (dollars) 
O-10          4,262         5,083 5,057 
0-9          4,262         4,983 4,893 
0-8          4,262         4,616 4,518 
0-7          4,262         4,400 4,397 
0-6          1,826         4,024 4,018 
0-5          1,769         3,899 3,701 
0-4          1,593         3,129 2,258 
0-3          1,365         2,789 1,755 
0-2          1,135         2,461 1,620 
0-1            882         2,201 1,055 


























W-3 , 2,519 1,399 
W-2 2,303 1,338 
W-l 2,027 1,153 
E-9 2,746 1,572 
E-8 2,594 1,480 
E-7 2,342 1,383 
E-6 1,325 1,247 
E-5 1,388 1,108 
E-4 1,267 975 
E-3 1,184 895 
E-2 1,010 797 
E-l 842 691 
Source:  From Military Compensation Background Papers, 1991, 
p. 127.  
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The complexity of the system has led to three major 
arguments in favor of taxing BAQ and BAS allowances. 
Initially, service members would gain a better appreciation 
for the true value of their compensation package.  The 
problem of the current non-taxable system is that personnel 
underestimate the tax advantage.  Second, such a move would 
remove the inequities of the current system.  Presently, the 
system favors persons in higher tax brackets, single 
personnel, senior military members, and those with no 
outside income.  Finally, providing taxable allowances would 
show the actual cost of the armed forces.  For example, in 
1985, DoD estimated that the cumulative tax advantage for 
military personnel was about $2.5 billion. (GAO/NSIAD-86-11, 
1986, pp. 61-62)  This is not recorded as a cost for the 
armed forces.  Instead, it is lost tax revenue, not 
collected from service members. 
4.  Defense Employment Cost Index 
As discussed in Chapter II, automatic pay adjustments 
have been a continuing process since implementation of the 
AVF.  The DECI recommended by the 7th QRMC, and developed in 
coordination with RAND, appears to be the next evolutionary 
step.  The DECI is designed to more accurately reflect the 
demographic composition of the armed forces.  In fact, the 
military contains a higher concentration of 18-to 
30-year-olds than in the civilian population.  The DECI 
would use data from the Current Population Survey, and weight 
reported civilian wages to reflect the military population. 
In this manner, the DECI can combat a common criticism of 
other indexes by better matching pay adjustments to the 
military's demographics.  Matching wages in this manner 
would be an advantage to the majority of youthful service 
members, but it may become a disadvantage to the older, 
career members of the military who find their pay lagging 
77 
behind that of their civilian counterparts. (7th QRMC, 1992, 
pp. 113-115) 
5. Entry-Level Pay Changes 
An internal labor market dictates that entry into an 
organization occurs only at the entry level.  Such is the 
case for the armed forces.  Individuals are recruited to 
enter military service primarily at the entry level (some 
exceptions exist for doctors, dentists, etc.).  Higher 
positions within the military are filled by service members 
who have "worked their way up the ranks."  A recent concern 
raised in the 7th QRMC is whether or not pay can be reduced 
for recruits at the entry level.  Considering budget 
cutbacks, force drawdowns, and force structure 
uncertainties, this could clearly become a heated topic of 
debate in the near future.  The analysis conducted by the 
7th QRMC supports a slight slowdown in the pay rates for new 
recruits.  However, the Commission cautions against 
retarding pay rates without considering all potential 
variables. (7th QRMC, 1992, pp. 142-143) 
B.  LESSONS LEARNED 
1.  Basic Allowance for Subsistence Rates are 
Inequitable 
Unlike BAQ, BAS has no relationship with the_ member's 
marital status or number of dependents.  Therefore, the 
different rates paid to service members cannot be justified 
on institutional or paternalistic grounds.  Similarly, the 
different rates cannot be justified through market analysis, 
since none of the rates reflect the government's estimate of 
the cost-to-feed.  The allowance for subsistence is designed 
"to provide a cash allowance to members of the armed forces 
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to defray a portion of the cost of subsistence."  (MCBP, 
1991, p. 103)  Ignoring differences in physical size, 
appetites, and individual tastes, the majority of military 
personnel have comparable food costs.  Therefore, if meals 
are not provided to personnel expense-free, all service 
members, regardless of rank, should be entitled to the same 
subsistence allowance. 
2. Annual Pay Adjustments are Evolving 
Continuing research on the DECI indicates the concept 
of annual pay adjustments for service members has developed 
into an expected component of the military compensation 
program.  Prior to the implementation of the AVF, this was 
not the case.  Pay adjustments were haphazard and not 
provided on a regular basis.  However, development of the 
DECI shows the intent to match the military's demographics 
with wages appropriate for the force.  By matching wages and 
demographics, the nation will be able to provide competitive 
compensation to obtain the desired armed force. 
3. Tax Advantage is Inequitable and Misleading 
The tax advantage provided through tax-exempt 
allowances is inequitable because the benefit gained is 
dependent upon each individual's specific situation.  Not 
only does this system provide greater compensation to one 
member over another, but it masks the true costs of 
maintaining an armed force.  The tax advantage shifts part 
of the burden of paying for the force from actual monetary 
outlays to revenue losses from taxable income.  The tax 
advantage also raises two important questions for personnel 
policy makers. First, do service members sufficiently 
understand and appreciate the gain created through 
nontaxable allowances?  Second, does the nation understand 
the true cost associated with maintaining the armed forces? 
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VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The end of the draft in 1973 required the development 
of a compensation philosophy that would enable the nation to 
attract and retain the necessary numbers and quality of 
personnel for voluntary service in the armed forces. 
Initially, the nation had to resolve several fundamental 
differences of opinion with respect to a citizen's 
obligation to serve, the character of the military, equity 
of service, and the President's ability to wage war, among 
others. (DoD, 1978, p. 229)  The Gates Commission studied 
these concerns and the nation's ability to staff the armed 
forces through all-volunteer means. The Commission's 
recommendations on the issues of the tax-in-kind paid by 
conscripts and the desire to spread the economic burden of 
national defense to all taxpayers finally helped to end the 
military draft in 1973.  The compensation system that has 
evolved since 1973 has reflected many of these challenges. 
Frequently, concerns over cost and rising pays became focal 
points for adversaries of all-voluntary service. 
The AVF itself raised many issues for the nation's 
compensation specialists.  A difficult matter to address 
centered on the X-factor, or the unique requirements of 
military service.  The recognition that military service 
limits an individual's freedoms and requires contracted 
service periods, created a compensation quandary for AVF 
supporters and opponents alike.  As the nation has grown to 
internalize the concept of the AVF, we have witnessed the 
continual improvement and development of the compensation 
system to address these dilemmas.  The primary method of 
evaluating military pay has traditionally been through 
regular military compensation, which is comprised of basic 
pay and allowances for food and housing. 
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The desire to have a consistent and competitive system 
for compensating personnel is witnessed through the 
development of automatic pay adjustments.  The nation has 
experimented with two different adjustment mechanisms 
throughout the history of the AVF.  A third method was 
proposed in 1993 and it is still under review.  Each new 
mechanism has been an incremental improvement over its 
predecessor. 
Basically, there are two general methods for 
determining military pay and benefits.  These are called the 
institutional and market approaches.  Proponents of the 
institutional approach believe that every service member's 
role is to defend the United States, regardless of his or 
her assigned occupational specialty.  The compensation 
system should be designed to encourage equal commitment to 
the armed forces and national defense, they maintain, 
regardless of any skill or job differences.  They further 
support the paternalistic application of benefits to all 
personnel.  Thus, deferred income, in-kind payments, and 
benefits based upon the need of service members are 
consistent with their philosophy. 
Conversely, proponents of the market approach support a 
skill-based compensation program that places higher worth on 
the individual.  They do not place equal value on the 
contributions of service members who have different 
occupational skills or abilities.  The significance of 
personal capabilities, they say, should be determined by 
supply and demand criteria in the open market.  The market 
approach is highly individualistic, placing emphasis on 
current income and the personal preferences of military 
personnel. 
As it turns out, the current system of military 
compensation is a balanced blend of institutional and market 
philosophies.  It is based upon an institutionally desired 
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base of pay and benefits provided to all service members. 
The market then dictates what additional incentives and 
bonuses are paid to attract and retain critical personnel or 
recruit for hard-to-fill positions.  This combination has 
been critical because of the military's closed manpower 
system and internal labor market.  The closed system 
requires that entry-level positions be filled from the labor 
market.  All subsequent positions are filled by personnel 
from within the armed forces.  The military has consequently 
developed an approach to pay that is competitive enough to 
attract new recruits and encourage career service. 
The clash between institutional and market approaches 
can also be seen in their separate philosophies on setting 
levels of military pay.  Institutionalists primarily support 
the concept of pay comparability.  Pay comparability 
compares the military with similar civilian occupations and 
strives to achieve equal pay for substantially equal work. 
The ultimate objective is to obtain adequate wages that will 
continue to attract and retain qualified personnel to the 
armed forces.  Proponents of the market approach, on the 
other hand, support the concept of pay competitiveness, 
which allows military wages to be based upon labor market 
rates.  By targeting wage rates in specific fields, they 
claim the military can be staffed at considerable savings 
over the universal approach recommended by institutional 
thinkers.  Once again, the approach toward military 
compensation that has evolved since the end of the draft 
creates a mix of both comparability and competitiveness, 
balancing aspects of the market and institutional 
philosophies.  Suffice it to say, the development of a 
workable system of compensation for the AVF has involved a 
myriad of controversies, disagreements, failures, and 
successes. 
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This study has identified 18 "lessons learned" from the 
development of the compensation system over the past twenty 
years.  In summary, they are as follows: 
1. Wage comparability surveys are inaccurate.  Neither 
the PATC nor the ECI have effectively captured the 
demographics of the military. 
2. Automatic wage adjustments are poorly executed. 
Both the PATC and ECI are measures of labor wage rates. 
Universal application of these increases to housing and food 
allowances does not amount to an efficient use funds. 
3. The intent of allowances is good.  However, the 
application of wage rate increases has removed the 
correlation between BAS and BAQ and the costs they are 
intended to defer. 
4. Compensation initiatives have had a powerful effect 
on personnel recruiting and retention.  Wage rates, 
allowances, and benefits will continue to influence the 
ability of the armed forces to recruit and retain the 
necessary quantity and quality of personnel. 
5. Educational benefits likewise affect personnel 
recruiting and retention. Post-service educational 
incentives play an important role in attracting new 
recruits, but they also encourage people to leave the 
military. 
6. The compensation system is perceived as being 
equitable.  This is apparent in the continuing success of 
the AVF to attract and retain highly-qualified personnel and 
in other measures of force effectiveness and performance. 
7. Bonuses are efficient and flexible.  Selective 
enlistment and reenlistment bonuses have allowed the nation 
to provide a base pay for all service members and provide 
added incentives, as required, to maintain the AVF. 
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8. S&I pays are vital for force management.  These 
pays provide additional pay to attract and retain required 
personnel in difficult-to-fill positions.  Without S&I pays, 
the military would have to overpay the majority of the force 
to obtain critical personnel. 
9. S&I pays should be updated regularly.  Because of 
their importance, these pays should be evaluated and revised 
on a regular basis. 
10. Institutional and market approaches to 
compensation are both important, but neither is satisfactory 
by itself.  The current blend of elements from each approach 
has worked well for the AVF. 
11. The internal labor market is consistent with 
institutional strategies.  The internal labor market 
encourages several practices, such as career earnings value, 
that are consistent with the institutional philosophy. 
12. No set of codified principles on compensation 
currently exist.  The military compensation system has 
evolved in an often-haphazard, disorganized, and conflicting 
fashion. 
13. The compensation system is complex but adequate. 
The current system is a complex blend of several competing 
principles, yet it has worked to provide a balanced and 
competent military force. 
14. The development of guiding principles for military 
compensation policy would be beneficial.  These guidelines 
would generate confidence in the ability of the compensation 
system to meet the needs of the armed forces, individual 
service members, and the nation. 
15. Pay comparability is required for competitive 
military pay.  Pay comparability provides the means to 
access the potential of career earnings required in an 
internal labor market. 
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16. Basic allowance for subsistence rates are 
inequitable.  The different rates for service members bear 
no relation to needs or dependency factors.  The various 
rates and resulting differences cannot be defended on the 
basis of either the institutional or market philosophy. 
17. Annual pay adjustments are evolving.  The proposed 
DECI is the next effort to better match the demographics of 
the military with the civilian populace and obtain a more 
accurate comparison of wages. 
18. Tax advantage is inequitable and misleading.  The 
tax advantage incurred is highly dependent upon individual 
factors, such as marital status, which affects the member's 
tax liabilities.  Additionally, the tax advantage masks the 
true cost of manning the armed forces. 
Each lesson learned should be considered on its own 
merit.  However, there are two major points that encompass 
all eighteen lessons.  First, the compensation system is 
very complex.  It is a hybrid approach that incorporates 
features of both the institutional and market concepts. 
Because of this complexity, it is difficult to compare 
wages, allowances, and benefits, provided to service members 
with those provided in the civilian sector.  Attempts to 
ensure equity or competitiveness are noble but difficult to 
fulfill because of the way in which the system has evolved. 
Additionally, it must be recognized that this hybrid 
approach to compensation has been successful.  The system 
has worked to provide a military force highly capable of 
defending the nation's interests at home and abroad. 
Furthermore, the system has been flexible enough to adjust 
as required in attracting and retaining adequate numbers and 
quality of personnel.  Even through the darkest period of 
the AVF, the so-called "hollow force" of the late 1970s, 
military compensation was manipulated to provide additional 
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basic and incentive pays and help restore the force to 
required levels.  The resulting success of the system can be 
largely attributed to: 1) adoption of important principles 
from both the institutional and market approaches to 
military compensation; 2) a prevailing "can-do" attitude on 
the part of government officials to make the AVF work; 3) 
the many studies and analyses by various agencies and 
commissions of what works and what does not; and 4) as the 
Gates Commission speculated, the patriotism and dedication 
of American youth (Gates, 1970, p.6). 
Although the compensation system has been flexible 
enough to meet force needs, there are still several areas 
that can be improved.  Initially, the flexibility of the 
system is challenged on a regular basis because the nation 
has not adopted a formal set of compensation principles (7th 
QRMC, 1992, p. 151).  The potential benefit of compensation 
principles was discussed in Chapter IV.  To ensure 
consistency throughout evolutionary compensation 
adjustments,  a set of underlying principles should be 
adopted. 
Second, the unique blend or balance of the 
institutional and market philosophies should be continued. 
Each ideology has both positive and negative aspects with 
respect to military compensation.  By using selected aspects 
of each program, the nation can build an effective program. 
While it may be true that a cheaper system could be 
implemented through a pure market approach, the question 
arises as to whether this would create a force the nation 
wants or needs.  The unique considerations of the X-factor, 
or the special demands of military service, do not easily 
relate to market analysis.  At the same time, the 
institutional concept of citizen responsibility, patriotism, 
and service in behalf of the nation's defense should not be 
abandoned. 
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Several aspects of the market approach are extremely 
vital to an effective compensation system.  The adjustments 
to BAS and BAQ rates should be tied directly to food and 
housing costs.  The BAS rates provided to individual service 
members should not only reflect food costs, but should be 
uniform across grades.  There is little justification for 
two service members of the same grade, neither of which is 
provided government meals, to be paid different rates of 
BAS.  It is not only a gross inequity, but it further 
complicates the compensation system. 
Despite certain inequities and minor inconsistencies, 
the compensation system has done a good job of meeting the 
needs of the armed forces.  Earlier in Chapter I, the Gates 
Commission was quoted from its 1970 final report stating 
that a 
fundamental consideration that has guided this 
commission is the need to maintain and improve the 
effectiveness, dignity, and status of the armed 
forces so they may continue to play the proper 
role. (Gates Commission, 1970, p. 5) 
During the past twenty years the compensation system has 
complemented that consideration and has provided the United 
States with an effective, proud, and dignified armed force. 
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APPENDIX A.  PAYS AND ALLOWANCES SUMMARY 







$110 per month 1955 1985 
Aviation Career 
Incentive Pay 
$125-650 per month 1974 1989 
Aviation Officer 
Continuation Pay 
Up to $12,000 per year 1980 1989 
Basic Pay $753.60-9,016.80 per 
month 
1790 1993 
Career Sea Pay $50-520 per month 1835 1987 
Certain Places Pay $8-22.50 per month 1900 1949 
Clothing Maintenance 
Allowance 
$151.20-288 per year 
1949 1989 
Combat Pay $110 per month 1952 1985 
Death Gratuity $3,000 1908 1986 
Deceleration Subject 
Duty Pay 
$110 per month 1955 1985 
Demolition Duty Pay $110 per month 1949 1985 
Dental Officer 
Special Pay 




$594-1,633 per month 
1957 1991 
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Dislocation Allowance 2 months' BAQ 1955 1985 




Up to $3,000 per year 
1981 1981 
Enlistment Bonus Up to $12,000 1791 1989 
Family Separation 
Allowance 
FSA I-Up to 1 months' 
BAQ 






Flight Deck Duty Pay $110 per month 1965 1985 
Flight Pay (air 
weapons) 
$125-350 per month 
1981 1981 
Flight Pay (crew) $110-250 per month 1913 1985 
Flight Pay (non-crew) $110 per month 1934 1985 
Foreign Language 
Proficiency Pay 
Up to $100 per month 
1986 1986 
High Pressure Chamber 
Duty Pay 
$110 per month 
1963 1985 
Low Pressure Chamber 
Duty Pay 




Up to $8,000 
1976 1985 
Nuclear Career Annual 
Incentive Bonus 






$12,000 per year up to 
a total of $60,000 1969 1985 
Operational 
Submersible Duty Pay 








(Variable based on 
exchange rates) 
$10-3,500 per month 





Parachute Duty Pay $110 per month ($165 
HALO) 
1941 1985 






Quarters Allowance $6.90-879.60 per month 1878 1993 
Reenlistment Bonus Up to $45,000 1791 1989 
Responsibility Pay $50-150 per month 1958 1958 





120% of product of 
years of service 











Up to $275 per month 
1958 1984 
Special Incentive Pay 
for Health 
Professionals 




$75-595 per month 
1901 1987 
Subsistence Allowance $4.65-9.94 per day 1808 1993 
Thermal Experiment 
Subject Pay 
$110 per month 
1957 1985 
Toxic Fuels and 
Propellants Exposure 
Pay 




Up to $716 per month 
1981 1991 
Source: Military Compensation Background Papers, 1991, pp. 
xiii-xiv. 
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APPENDIX B. 7TH QRMC CLASSIFICATION OF 
SPECIAL AND INCENTIVE PAYS 
The 7th QRMC recognized that the purpose of S&I pays 
has changed over the years, as explained in Chapter III.  To 
better manage these pays, the commission proposed the 
following classifications: hazardous duty, career incentive, 
and skill incentive.  This categorization of S&I pays 
provides a vivid demonstration of how their purpose has 




lype of Pay 
Flight Pay (not as a crew member) 
Parachute Duty 
Demolition Duty 
Pressure Chamber Duty 
Acceleration or Deceleration Experimental 
Subject 
Thermal Stress Test Subject 
Flight Deck Duty 
Toxic Pesticide, Virus, or Bacteria 
Exposure 
Handling Toxic Fuels 




Flight Pay (crew member and air weapons] 
Aviation Career Incentive Pay 
Diving Duty- 
Career Sea Pay- 
Special Duty Assignment 
Overseas Extension Pay 
Submarine Duty 
Foreign Language Proficiency 
Medical Officers Board Certification 
Medical Officers Variable Special 
Dental Officers Board Certification 
Dental Officers Variable Special 
Optometrists Regular Special 
Psychologists 
Nonphysicians Health Care Providers 
Veterinarians 
Certain Places Pay 





Selective Reenlistment Bonus 
Nuclear Qualified Enlisted Members 
Nurse Anesthetists 
Optometrists Retention Special Pay 
Aviation Career Officers Extending Active 
Duty- 
Engineering and Science Career 
Continuation 
Acquisition Corps Continuation Bonus 
Medical Officers Multiyear Retention Bonus 
Medical Officers Incentive Special Pay 
Nuclear Qualified Officers Extending 
Active Duty 
Nuclear Career Annual Incentive Bonus 
Dental Officers Additional Special Pay 
Medical Officers Additional Special Pay 
Enlistment Bonus 
Army Enlistment Bonus 
Accession Bonus for Registered Nurses 
Nuclear Career Accession Bonus 
Source:  7th QRMC, 1992, pp. 100-101 
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APPENDIX C. STATE INCOME TAX PROVISIONS 
The tax advantage gained by each individual service 
member is affected, not only by federal tax codes, but also 
by the treatment of military compensation as taxable income 
at the state level as well.  In the majority of states, 
military compensation is included in income subject to 
taxation under the same terms as is income under federal tax 
codes.  However, each state's tax code provides different 
exemptions and credits for military compensation of legal 
state residents.  The following chart indicates those states 
that provide added tax advantage to members of the armed 
forces.  The tax information is taken from Military 
Compensation Background Papers, 4th edition, 1991, pp. 730- 
738. 
No State Tax or 

















No State Tax on 
Members not 
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